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Abstract
Global crisis forms new economic policy agenda which raises new questions for economic theory 
and economic thinking. This paper deals with these new intellectual challenges. Among them: growth 
theory and the risks of secular stagnation, unconventional macroeconomic policy and the prospects 
RI¿QDQFLDOVWDELOLW\LQHTXDOLW\DQGJURZWKWKHQHZZHOIDUHVWDWHWKHSURVSHFWVRIJOREDOL]DWLRQYV
GHJOREDOL]DWLRQDQGWKHUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQLQDGYDQFHGHFRQRPLHV%DVHGRQWKHDQDO\VLVRIJOREDO
trends, the paper discusses the roots and features of current Russian economic problems, compares the 
±DQG±FULVHVDQGIDFWRUL]HVWKHODVWRQHRQWKUHHPDLQFRPSRQHQWV7KHDQDO\VLV
includes the effects of sanctions against Russia on the current economic situation and the structural 
problems that slow down economic growth. Special attention is paid to examples of medium-term and 
long-term steps that can provide sustainable development for the Russian economy.
1RQSUR¿WSDUWQHUVKLS³9RSURV\(NRQRPLNL´+RVWLQJE\(OVHYLHU%9$OOULJKWVUHVHUYHG
-(/FODVVL¿FDWLRQ F63, O52, P17, P27. 
.H\ZRUGVHFRQRPLFSROLF\HFRQRPLFJURZWKFULVLVJOREDOL]DWLRQUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ5XVVLD
1. Introduction: Global crises  —  in general and in particular
(FRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWLQWKHDGYDQFHGFRXQWULHVLVEHLQJGHWHUPLQHGSULPDULO\E\WKH
causes and the character of the global crisis that erupted in 2008 and that continues to the 
present day. This crisis is of a particular type: it cannot be explained in terms of one or two 
parameters (for example, in terms of decline in production or growth in unemployment), 
and it is multi-dimensional and affects many spheres of socio-economic life. In most cases, 
it has had serious socio-political consequences. This is a systemic crisis and, in this respect, 
resembles the crises of the 1930s and the 1970s (Mau, 2009).
Comparisons are not straightforward. The lessons learned in overcoming the systemic cri-
VHVRIWKHSDVWFDQQRWDXWRPDWLFDOO\EHDSSOLHGLQGLIIHUHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV(YHQVRV\VWHPLF
crises have a number of qualitative features in common. This means they can be treated as 
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a single category and compared, even if the anti-crisis policies that were effective in one case 
do not apply in another. We consider the distinguishing features of a systemic crisis to be the 
following.
)LUVWA systemic crisis is both cyclical and structural. It involves fundamental institutional 
and technological changes, that is, a transformation of the technological base (which some 
HFRQRPLVWVWHUPWKH³PRGHRIWHFKQRORJ\´7KHVHFKDQJHVUDLVHWKHHFRQRP\WRDTXDOLWDWL
YHO\KLJKHUOHYHORIHI¿FLHQF\DQGODERUSURGXFWLYLW\$UHQHZDORIWKHWHFKQRORJLFDOEDVH
GXULQJZKLFKWKHODWHVWWHFKQLFDODQGVFLHQWL¿FLQQRYDWLRQVDUHDSSOLHGLVWKHPDLQSUHFRQGL-
tion for emerging from the crisis.1
6HFRQG$¿QDQFLDOFULVLVLVDVLJQL¿FDQWFRPSRQHQWRIDQ\V\VWHPLFFULVLV7KHFRP-
ELQDWLRQRI¿QDQFLDOFULVLVDQGHFRQRPLFFULVLV GHFOLQH LQSURGXFWLRQDQGHPSOR\PHQW
UHQGHUV WKH FULVLV HYHQPRUHGLI¿FXOW WR RYHUFRPHDQG FUHDWHV WKHQHHG IRU DYDULHW\RI
structural and institutional reforms to steer the economy back onto a trajectory of sustain-
able growth.
7KLUG The consequence of a systemic crisis is the formation of a new economic growth 
PRGHO WKLV LQYROYHV WKH VWUXFWXUDOPRGHUQL]DWLRQ RI ERWK WKH GHYHORSHG DQG GHYHORSLQJ
HFRQRPLHVDQGLQWXUQWKHFUHDWLRQRIQHZWHFKQRORJLFDO³GULYHUV´$WSUHVHQWWKHHPHU-
gence of new branches and sectors of the productive economy, and their geographical re-
location throughout the world, is creating a new global economic reality that poses new 
challenges that require the adoption of new instruments of economic policy. This trend is 
FDSWXUHGZHOOLQDQH[SUHVVLRQWKDWEHJDQWREHXVHGLQ³WKHQHZQRUPDO´(O(ULDQ
2010; Ulyukaev, 2010).
)RXUWK6LJQL¿FDQWJHRSROLWLFDODQGJHRHFRQRPLFVKLIWVWDNHSODFHDQGQHZEDODQFHV
of power (involving both countries and regions) are achieved on a global scale. In the early 
stages of the present crisis, it was assumed that this would result in the consolidation of 
a  bi-polar world centered around the United States and China, sometimes referred to as the 
³*´WKH³%LJ7ZR´%U]H]LQVNLRU³&KLPHULFD´)HUJXVRQ+RZHYHUZHDUH
gradually but ever more distinctly beginning to see the formation of a multi-polar world in 
which two or three key economic centers predominate but that resembles a return to the well-
NQRZQQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\³FRQFHUWRIQDWLRQV´PRGHOZKLFKLVKHOGLQSODFHE\WKHQHHGWR
balance interests. With adjustments to take present-day circumstances into account, we could 
speak of a balance of interests among regional power groupings.
)LIWK During the course of a systemic crisis, important changes take place in the regula-
tion of socio-economic processes. During the 1930s, the transition to a phase of industrial 
GHYHORSPHQWZDVEURXJKWWRFRPSOHWLRQDVZHUHWKHLGHRORJ\DQGSUDFWLFHRIWKH³ELJJRYHUQ
PHQW´7KLVPHDQWDQLQFUHDVHLQWD[DWLRQDQGRIEXGJHWH[SHQGLWXUHVWDWHSURSHUW\DQGSODQ-
QLQJDQGLQVRPHFDVHVWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRISULFHVE\WKHVWDWH%\FRQWUDVWWKHFULVLVRI
WKHVUHVXOWHGLQODUJHVFDOHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQDQGGHUHJXODWLRQLQDUHGXFWLRQLQWD[DWLRQ
DQGLQSULYDWL]DWLRQ²LQDZRUGLQZKDWZDVUHTXLUHGIRUWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRDSRVWLQGXVWULDO
stage of technological development. At the beginning of the current crisis, it seemed that the 
ZRUOGZDVDJDLQUHWXUQLQJWRDPRGHORIVWDWHGRPLQDWLRQRIWKHHFRQRP\WKHWHUP³&UDVV
.H\QHVLDQLVP´ KDVEHHQHPSOR\HG+RZHYHUWKLVWHQGHQF\GRHVQRWVHHPWRKDYHHVWDE-
lished itself. Certainly, there has been an increase in state regulation, but it seems to have 
EHHQFRQ¿QHGSULPDULO\WRQDWLRQDODQGJOREDO¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV,WLVWUXHWKDWDVLJQL¿FDQW
DQRPDO\FXUUHQWO\H[LVWVLQWKDWZKLOH¿QDQFLDODFWLYLW\RSHUDWHVRQDJOREDOVFDOHUHJXODWRU\
mechanisms have remained national. In the absence of a system of global governance, there 
LVQHHGIRUDPHFKDQLVPWRUHJXODWHJOREDO¿QDQFH
 1 6RPH HFRQRPLVWV KDYH LQWHUSUHWHG FKDQJHV LQ WKH WHFKQRORJLFDO EDVH DV DQ H[DPSOH RI ³ORQJ F\FOHV RI
FRQMXQFWXUH´ORQJZDYHVRIWR\HDUVLQGXUDWLRQSHU1'.RQGUDWLHY7KLV LVDQLQWHUHVWLQJDQG
SRWHQWLDOO\ XVHIXO K\SRWKHVLV EXW LW KDV QRW EHHQ HPSLULFDOO\ SURYHQ QRU FDQ LW EH LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI VXI¿FLHQW
VWDWLVWLFDOGDWD.RQGUDWLHYKLPVHOIFRQVLGHUHG³ORQJF\FOHV´WREHRQO\DK\SRWKHVLV
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6L[WK$V\VWHPLFFULVLVSODFHVWKHQHHGIRUDQHZJOREDO¿QDQFLDODUFKLWHFWXUH)ROORZLQJ
WKHFULVLVRIWKHVWKHZRUOGDGRSWHGDVLQJOHUHVHUYHFXUUHQF\²WKH86GROODU$IWHUWKH
VDGXDOV\VWHPEDVHGRQWKHGROODUDQGWKHHXURZDVDGRSWHG+RZWKHFXUUHQF\V\VWHP
will evolve in the aftermath of the present crisis is not yet clear. If there is a consolidation of 
regional groupings in the global balance of power, this might be accompanied by a strength-
ening of the Chinese yuan or of regional reserve currencies. A proliferation of reserve cur-
rencies could contribute to the emergence of a multi-polar world and encourage increased 
accountability by the corresponding monetary authorities (to the extent that the reserve cur-
rencies would compete with each other).
6HYHQWKA new economic doctrine has been formulated, that is, a new orthodoxy in think-
LQJ([DPSOHVIURPWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\LQFOXGH.H\QHVLDQLVPDQGQHROLEHUDOLVP
All of the above have important implications for understanding how to overcome a sys-
temic crisis and manage the processes involved. A systemic crisis poses a profound intel-
lectual challenge: a fundamental examination of its causes and development is needed, 
as are the means for overcoming it. Just as generals are always preparing by looking at 
wars of the past, so politicians and economists tend to think in terms of crises of the past. 
This might be appropriate as long as the problem seems to be the business cycle. This is 
ZK\WKH¿UVWUHVSRQVHWRDV\VWHPLFFULVLVHQWDLOVUHFRXUVHWRWKHPHWKRGVRIWKHSDVW,Q
WKHVZHKDG WKH FDVHRI WKHJRYHUQPHQWRI+HUEHUW+RRYHU DQGSULPDULO\RIKLV
Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon), who decided not to interfere in the natural course 
of events, maintaining a strictly balanced budget and strengthening the monetary system 
based on the gold standard. As the experience of the preceding 100 years seemed to show, 
crises usually lasted only a year, and no special policy was needed to bring them to an end. 
Similarly, in the 1970s, the methods applied at the beginning of the crisis were those of 
conventional Keynesian regulation (budget stimulation during decelerating growth rates 
and even, during the  administration of Richard Nixon, government price controls), but this 
UHVXOWHGLQDVXUJHRILQÀDWLRQDQGWKHRQVHWRIVWDJÀDWLRQ
In fact, systemic crises cannot be dealt with by applying the economic policies of preced-
ing decades. Too many new problems arise, and it is unclear from the outset what mechanisms 
are driving the crisis, what is its scale, how long it will last, and how it can be overcome. In 
the twentieth century, it usually took around ten years to overcome a systemic crisis. Paul 
Volcker drew attention to this circumstance in July 1979, in the midst of the last systemic 
FULVLVZKHQKHZDVDSSRLQWHG&KDLUPDQRIWKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH6\VWHP³ZH¶UHIDFHWRIDFH
ZLWKHFRQRPLFGLI¿FXOWLHVUHDOO\XQLTXHWRRXUH[SHULHQFH$QGZH¶YHORVWWKDWHXSKRULD«
WKDWZHNQHZDOOWKHDQVZHUVWRPDQDJLQJWKHHFRQRP\´&DUWHU%RRN3
A systemic crisis cannot be understood merely as a recession, as an increase in unemploy-
PHQWRUDVDUXQRQWKHEDQNV,WFRPSULVHVDQXPEHURISKDVHVDQGZDYHVWKDWDIIHFWVSHFL¿F
sectors of the economy and, in particular, countries and regions. It lasts for approximately 
DGHFDGH RQH WKDW LV XVXDOO\ ³WXUEXOHQW´0RUHRYHU WKH VWDWLVWLFDO GDWD GR QRW DFFXUDWHO\
or even adequately describe the economic processes at work. While technological renewal 
WUDQVIRUPVWRDVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHWKHDFWXDOG\QDPLFVRIHFRQRPLFRXWSXWWKHVWDWLVWLFDO
methods in use fail to adequately describe the emergence of new sectors in the economy.
Problems also arise with employment statistics. An increase in employment is one of the 
PDLQLQGLFDWRUVWKDWDQHFRQRP\LVHPHUJLQJIURPDF\FOLFDOFULVLV+RZHYHULQWKHFDVHRI
a systemic crisis, this increase is apparent only at the very end. Technological renewal makes 
QHZGHPDQGVRQVWUXFWXUHRIODERUUHVRXUFHVLQRWKHUZRUGVVLJQL¿FDQWVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJHV
take place in the labor market. This means that during the emergence from a systemic crisis, 
an employment recovery will be delayed, and there will be high unemployment even as the 
HFRQRP\JURZV7KHROGVWDWLVWLFDOPHDVXUHVDUHLQFDSDEOHRIUHÀHFWLQJWKHUHDOLWLHVRIWKH
new economy, and some time is required before they are able to do so.
Finally, a systemic crisis cannot be overcome merely by macroeconomic policy or 
macroeconomic regulation, whatever the magnitude of budgetary, monetary, and credit 
790DX$8O\XNDHY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFV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problems might be. A responsible macroeconomic policy should not lose sight of the im-
SRUWDQFH RI VWUXFWXUDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH DQG RI WKH QHHG WRPRGHUQL]H WKH VRFLR
economic system.
A systemic crisis may be described as a period innovation in that it involves the emergence 
(before, during, and after the crisis) of new economic and political institutions, the  arrival 
of a new generation of political leaders, entrepreneurs and experts, and the construction of 
DQHZWHFKQRORJLFDOEDVH²WKHUHSODFHPHQWRIWKHWHFKQRORJ\WKDWZDVSURGXFHGGXULQJWKH
previous systemic crisis. Such a crisis is resolved only after the advances and transformations 
GHVFULEHGDERYHKDYHEHHQFRPSOHWHG²LQRWKHUZRUGVRQFHWKHSUREOHPVWKDWKDYHDULVHQ
have been resolved. We are referring primarily to:
x HFRQRPLFJURZWKUDWHVVSHFL¿FDOO\WKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDOHQJWK\SHULRGRIORZJURZWKUDWHV
(secular stagnation);
x new challenges in macroeconomic policy involving the widespread application of non-
traditional methods (particularly in the sphere of money circulation);
x the problem of inequality in the context of the emergence of a new model of economic 
growth, which is bound up with the problems from the lengthy slow-down that precedes 
economic recovery;
x a revision of our understanding of the theory and institutions of the welfare state in order 
WRWDNHWKHGHPRJUDSKLFDQGSROLWLFDOUHDOLWLHVRIWKHWZHQW\¿UVWFHQWXU\LQWRDFFRXQW
x WKHSURVSHFWVIRUJOREDOL]DWLRQRUGHJOREDOL]DWLRQ
x WKHSURVSHFWVIRUUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQDQGQHZWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDOOHQJHV
7KHSUREOHPVZHKDYHLGHQWL¿HGUHTXLUHUHWKLQNLQJWKHWKHRUHWLFDOIRXQGDWLRQVRISUHVHQW
day economic policy and of the practical measures currently being applied. During the years 
1980 – 2000, the priorities were economic growth and macroeconomic stability, and the main 
REVWDFOHV WR DFKLHYLQJ WKHVHZHUH FRQVLGHUHG LQÀDWLRQ DQG H[FHVVLYH VWDWH LQWHUYHQWLRQ LQ
PDQDJLQJWKHHFRQRP\7KLVLVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHJRDOVDQGULVNVDVVXPPDUL]HGLQ
WKH VRFDOOHG ³:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV´ DVHW RI JXLGHOLQHV DLPHGSULPDULO\ DW GHYHORSLQJ
countries (Williamson, 1989). We do not deny the importance of macroeconomic stability, 
EXWHFRQRPLVWVDQGSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVDUHQRZFRQIURQWHGZLWKWKHWDVNRI¿QGLQJDGGLWLRQDO
tools with which to manage economic development. 
2. Stimulating economic growth
In the decade before the crisis, the world experienced unprecedentedly high growth rates. 
It was considered that they were the result of the new methods of political and economic 
PDQDJHPHQWZKLFKFRXOGFRQWLQXHWREHDSSOLHGLQGH¿QLWHO\7KLVZDVZK\PRQHWDU\DX-
thorities (especially in the United States) were reluctant to restrict growth in lending, which 
ZRXOGKDYHKHOSHGDYRLGRYHUKHDWLQJWKHHFRQRP\+LJKJURZWKUDWHVZHUHDFKLHYHGLQERWK
the developed and developing countries. Now growth has slowed down, and this has raised 
a number of questions.
6KRXOGZHFRQVLGHUORZJURZWKUDWHVWREHDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKH³QHZQRUPDO´SHRSOH
EHJDQWDONLQJDERXWDVHDUO\DVWKHRQVHWRIWKHFULVLV7DEOHV±"'RHVWKH³QHZQRUPDO´ 
consist primarily of particular instruments of monetary policy (quantitative easing , low 
interest rates, etc.), or do we mean that as a result of these policies a sustainable period of low 
JURZWKUDWHVZLOOEHDFKLHYHG",QRWKHUZRUGVGRFXUUHQWORZJURZWKUDWHVUHÀHFWVKRUWWHUP
problems (that are an integral part of the crisis that has not yet been overcome), or are they 
a characteristic feature of a future, post-crisis model of economic development?2 
There is a related question concerning the growth prospects for emerging economies and, 
especially, for the countries that were expected to produce an economic miracle. The very 
 2 Larry Summers doubted the feasibility of ensuring sustainable growth in the United States in the long term 
(Summers, 2013, 2014).
8
90
DX$8
O\XNDHY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRP
LFVí

Table 1 
GDP growth rates, 1990 –2013 (%).
Share of 
global 
GDP,  
2013
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World 3.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 3.4 3.4 3.9 4.2 2.5 3.6 4.8 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.4 4.9 5.6 5.7 3.0 0.0 5.4 4.1 3.4 3.3
Advanced 
economies
43.62 3.3 1.5 2.3 1.5 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.6 2.7 3.6 4.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 3.2 2.8 3.1 2.8 0.1 –3.4 3.1 1.7 1.2 1.4
United States 16.45 1.9 –0.1 3.6 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.8 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.1 1.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.3 2.7 1.8 –0.3 –2.8 2.5 1.6 2.3 2.2
Japan 4.58 5.6 3.3 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.9 2.6 1.6 –2.0 –0.2 2.3 0.4 0.3 1.7 2.4 1.3 1.7 2.2 –1.0 –5.5 4.7 –0.5 1.5 1.5
Germany 3.45 5.7 5.0 1.5 –1.0 2.5 1.8 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 3.3 1.6 0.0 –0.4 0.7 0.9 3.9 3.4 0.8 –5.1 3.9 3.4 0.9 0.5
UK 2.28 1.8 –1.3 1.3 3.5 5.0 3.5 3.5 4.4 3.6 2.9 4.4 2.2 2.3 3.9 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.4 –0.8 –5.2 1.7 1.1 0.3 1.7
France 2.49 2.9 1.0 1.6 –0.6 2.3 2.1 1.4 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.9 2.0 1.1 0.8 2.8 1.6 2.4 2.4 0.2 –2.9 2.0 2.1 0.3 0.3
Italy 2.00 2.1 1.4 0.8 –0.9 2.2 2.9 1.1 1.9 1.4 1.5 3.7 1.9 0.5 0.0 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 –1.2 –5.5 1.7 0.4 –2.4 –1.9
Canada 1.49 0.2 –2.1 0.9 2.3 4.8 2.7 1.7 4.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 1.7 2.8 1.9 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.0 1.2 –2.7 3.4 2.5 1.7 2.0
(PHUJLQJ
economies
56.38 3.8 3.9 2.5 3.2 3.3 4.1 5.2 5.0 2.3 3.7 5.7 3.8 4.6 6.4 8.0 7.3 8.2 8.6 5.8 3.1 7.5 6.2 5.1 4.7
China 15.84 3.8 9.2 14.2 14.0 13.1 10.9 10.0 9.3 7.8 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7
India 6.65 5.5 1.1 5.5 4.8 6.7 7.6 7.5 4.1 6.2 8.8 3.8 4.8 3.8 7.9 7.9 9.3 9.3 9.8 3.9 8.5 10.3 6.6 4.7 5.0
Russian 
Federation
3.43 –5.0 –14.5 –8.7 –12.7 –4.1 –3.6 1.4 –5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 –7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.3
%UD]LO 2.96 –4.2 1.0 –0.5 4.7 5.3 4.4 2.2 3.4 0.0 0.3 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.2 –0.3 7.5 2.7 1.0 2.5
Indonesia 2.34 7.2 7.0 6.5 8.0 7.5 8.2 7.8 4.7 –13.1 0.8 4.2 3.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.3 5.8
Mexico 2.02 5.2 4.2 3.6 2.6 4.7 –5.8 5.9 7.0 4.7 2.7 5.3 –0.6 0.1 1.4 4.3 3.0 5.0 3.1 1.4 –4.7 5.1 4.0 4.0 1.1
South Korea 1.67 9.3 9.7 5.8 6.3 8.8 8.9 7.2 5.8 «5.7 10.7 8.8 4.5 7.4 2.9 4.9 3.9 5.2 5.5 2.8 0.7 6.5 3.7 2.3 3.0
Saudi Arabia 1.52 8.3 9.1 4.6 0.0 0.7 0.2 3.4 2.6 2.8 –0.7 4.9 0.5 0.1 7.7 5.3 7.3 5.6 6.0 8.4 1.8 7.4 8.6 5.8 4.0
South Africa 0.65 –0.3 –1.0 –2.1 1.2 3.2 3.1 4.3 2.6 0.5 2.4 4.2 2.7 3.7 2.9 4.6 5.3 5.6 5.5 3.6 –1.5 3.1 3.6 2.5 1.9
6RXUFHV5RVVWDW,0)2(&'
990DX$8O\XNDHY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
IRUPDWLRQRIWKH%5,&JURXSUHVWHGXSRQWKLVK\SRWKHVLV0DQ\KRSHVZHUHERXQGXSZLWK
the expectation of dynamic growth in these countries.
Initially, the acceleration in the development of emerging markets gave rise to expecta-
tions of a gradual convergence of the developed and developing economies. It was envisaged 
WKDWJLYHQDUHVSRQVLEOHHFRQRPLFSROLF\DSROLF\WKDWZRXOGEH³FRUUHFW´LQWHUPVRILQ-
ternational experience), less developed countries would achieve more rapid growth (Fig. 1).
$WWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHFULVLVZKHQLWZDVVWLOOWKRXJKWWREHDQ³$QJOR6D[RQ´SKHQR
menon, emerging markets even aspired to become safe havens where Western companies 
FRXOGWDNHVKHOWHUIURPWKHHFRQRPLFVWRUP7KLVJDYHULVHWRWKHK\SRWKHVLVRI³GHFRXSOLQJ´
WKDWLVRIDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKWKH%5,&FRXQWULHVDQGDQXPEHURIVLPLODUGHYHORSLQJHFRQR-
PLHVFRXOGSUHVHUYHWKHLUVWDELOLW\E\³GHWDFKLQJWKHPVHOYHV´IURPWKHGHYHORSPHQWSDWKRI
the Western world (including Japan) that had led to the crisis.
A debate ensued over the extent to which emerging economies could repeat their suc-
cesses of the previous 20 years in the foreseeable future. A hypothesis was put forward 
that the high growth rates of these countries during these years were anomalous and that 
a correction would follow that would bring them back to the levels of the 1970s and 1980s 
( Åslund, 2013).
:HPXVWQRWLJQRUHWKHSUREOHPRIWKHDGHTXDF\RIPHDVXULQJJURZWKUDWHV(YHUVLQFHWKH
concept of GDP was devised, there have been concerns about how it could be accurately mea-
sured. Particular problems arise during periods of structural change, that is, during periods of 
systemic (structural) crises. Renewal of the economic system drastically affects the reliability 
RIPHWULFVIRUWKHVL]HDQGWUHQGVLQ*'31HZVHFWRUVRIWKHHFRQRP\HVSHFLDOO\WKRVHWKDW
KDYHDSSHDUHGGXULQJWKHFULVLVDUHW\SLFDOO\GLI¿FXOWWRFDSWXUHXVLQJWKHVWDWLVWLFDOPHWKRGV
that had been formulated to address pre-existing economic realities. At the present time, the 
information and biotechnology sectors plus new material production fall into this category.3 
,WWDNHVWLPHIRUVWDWLVWLFVWRDGDSWWRWKHQHZUHDOLWLHVWKDWLVZK\DORZHULQJRIDQHFRQRP\¶V
 3 ³7KHVHPHDVXUHVZHUHGHVLJQHGIRUDVWHHODQGZKHDWHFRQRP\QRWRQHLQZKLFKLQIRUPDWLRQDQGGDWDDUHWKH
PRVWG\QDPLFVHFWRUV7KH\PLVPHDVXUHWKHFRQWULEXWLRQRILQQRYDWLRQVWRWKHHFRQRP\´0RN\U
Table 2 
GDP growth rates by period (average of period, %).
Share of world 
GDP, 2013
1990 – 
1995
1996 – 
2000
2001 – 
2007
2008– 
2009
2010– 
2013
World 2.9 3.8 4.4 1.5 4.1
Advanced economies 43.62 2.5 3.4 2.4 –1.6 1.8
United States 16.45 2.5 4.3 2.4 –1.5 2.2
Japan 4.58 2.1 0.8 1.4 –3.3 1.8
Germany 3.45 2.6 1.9 1.4 –2.2 2.2
UK 2.28 2.3 3.7 3.0 –3.0 1.2
France 2.49 1.6 2.9 1.9 –1.4 1.2
Italy 2.00 1.4 1.9 1.3 –3.3 –0.5
Canada 1.49 1.5 4.0 2.5 –0.8 2.4
(PHUJLQJHFRQRPLHV 56.38 3.5 4.4 6.7 4.4 5.9
China 15.84 10.8 8.6 10.8 9.4 8.8
India 6.65 5.2 6.1 7.5 6.2 6.6
Russian Federation 3.43 –9.1 1.6 6.8 –1.5 3.4
%UD]LO 2.96 1.7 2.0 3.4 2.4 3.4
Indonesia 2.34 7.4 0.6 5.1 5.3 6.2
Mexico 2.02 2.3 5.1 2.3 –1.7 3.5
South Korea 1.67 8.1 5.2 4.9 1.8 3.8
Saudi Arabia 1.52 3.8 2.6 4.6 5.1 6.4
South Africa 0.65 0.7 2.8 4.3 1.0 2.8
6RXUFHV5RVVWDW,0)2(&'
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level of development during a systemic crisis can take place, especially at the stage when the 
crisis is coming to an end.
What light do the experiences of recent years shed upon these problems? The economic 
trends from 2008–2013 do not allow us to unambiguously conclude that the world has em-
barked upon a period of long-term low growth rates, and even less so that we have entered 
a period of long-term stagnation (secular stagnation). One can posit that such a model is 
HPHUJLQJ7HXOLQJVDQG%DOGZLQEXWDWSUHVHQWLWFDQQRWEHLGHQWL¿HGHPSLULFDOO\
WKHSHULRGRIORZJURZWKUDWHVKDVQRWODVWHGORQJHQRXJKIRUDQ\FRQ¿GHQWSUHGLFWLRQVWREH
made. Notwithstanding a slow-down in the world economy in 2012–2013, average growth 
rates during this period, while lower than during the 2000s, have nevertheless been in line 
with the average annual GDP growth rates throughout the world during the 1990s (Fig. 2). 
It is therefore premature to speak of long-term stagnation.
7KHJURZWKUDWHVRIGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVVORZHGGRZQVLJQL¿FDQWO\GXULQJWKHSUHFULVLV
period (by comparison with the 1990s) and during the post-crisis period. The contribution 
RIWKH(XURSHDQHFRQRPLHVWRWKLVVORZGRZQZDVVLJQL¿FDQWZKHUHDVWKHDYHUDJHDQQXDO
JURZWKUDWHVIRUQRQ(XURSHDQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVH[FHHGHG
(PHUJLQJHFRQRPLHVFXUUHQWO\FRQVWLWXWHWKHPRVWG\QDPLFJURXSDOWKRXJKWKHLUJURZWK
rates slowed down noticeably during 2012–2013. Their pre-eminence is due, as in the past, 
to the performance of Asian economies. The share of developing countries in global GDP 
is increasing, thanks to high growth rates in the developing countries of Asia. The group of 
dynamically growing developing countries has also been expanding, thanks in particular to 
the performance of Latin American economies.
The economic debate over long-term stagnation addresses several issues.47KH¿UVWLVFRQ-
cerned with whether long-term stagnation affects potential or real GDP. The factors contri-
buting to decreasing rates of potential GDP growth have been known since the 1980s, and they 
were at work during the entire period of rapid economic growth during the 1990s and 2000s. 
They include the following: 
x slowing rates of population growth in developed countries (in a number of countries there 
KDVHYHQEHHQDUHGXFWLRQLQSRSXODWLRQVL]H
x population aging and, in nearly all developed counties, reaching the natural limit in the 
portion of the population with higher education; 
 4 6HHIRUH[DPSOH7HXOLQJVDQG%DOGZLQ
Fig. 1. Dynamics of convergence (USD).
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x the development of outsourcing and the transfer of industrial production from developed 
to developing countries; 
x an increase in opportunity costs deriving from environmental issues.
7KH¿UVWWZRIDFWRUVDFFRXQWIRUWKHUHGXFHGUDWHVRIJURZWKLQWKHODERUVXSSO\ZKLOHWKH
other factors account for slowing growth rates for total factor productivity.5
'XULQJWKHVDQGVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHVHIDFWRUVZDVUHGXFHGE\WKHIROORZLQJ
growth in the services sector; stimulation of a consumption-based culture; an extension of the 
age at which people actively work; and a redistribution of value added in the production of new 
products between the developed and developing countries to the advantage of the former, even 
while physical production was located in the latter. Over and above all of this, in the measure-
ment of potential*'3JURZWKUDWHVPRUHVLJQL¿FDQFHZDVDWWDFKHGWRWKHquality of growth.
The factors that have contributed to the reduced rates of growth in actual GDP in recent 
years include the excessive burden of public and private debt on the economy, restrictions 
on immigration in the advanced countries, and completion of the effect of the technological 
cycle associated with the development of information and computer technology (IT).
A second issue in the debate over long-term stagnation addresses the question of whether 
this phenomenon affects all countries or only the developed ones. In listing the factors that 
contribute to slowing economic growth, we have referred in almost all cases to the group 
RI GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV+RZHYHU DVORZGRZQ LQ WKH GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV LQHYLWDEO\ KDV
a ripple effect on the growth rates of developing countries. The principal mechanisms pro-
ducing this effect are the outsourcing of production, the fact that the greatest volume of 
¿QDOGHPDQGH[LVWVLQWKHGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVWKHQHHGWRWUDQVIHUWHFKQRORJ\DQGFDSLWDO
IURPGHYHORSHGWRGHYHORSLQJHFRQRPLHVDQGWKHJOREDOL]DWLRQRIZRUOG¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV
which, during global decline in economic activity, tends to redirect capital from developing 
countries into risk-free assets (that is, into assets in the developed countries).
The dynamic of the real GDP of the developed countries has a direct impact on the real 
GDP of developing countries.
 5 On long-term problems of growth deceleration see Gordon, 2012, 2014.
Fig. 2. Rates of economic growth (%).
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The third issue concerns the convergence of living standards. As the work of Dani  Rodrik 
has shown (Rodrik, 2011b), there was a steady, long-term trend toward a convergence in 
living standards in different countries until approximately the middle of the twentieth centu-
ry. After this time, inter-country inequality did not decline and in some cases even increased. 
In fact, there has been a marked trend toward increasing differentiation between developing 
countries in this respect. On the one hand, a fairly large group composed of the largest de-
YHORSLQJHFRQRPLHV&KLQD6RXWK.RUHD5XVVLD%UD]LO&KLOH0H[LFR7XUNH\DQGRWKHUV
has been steadily catching up with the developed countries. This is according to indicators 
IRU WKHDEVROXWH VL]HRI WKHHFRQRP\DQG IRUSHUFDSLWD*'3HVSHFLDOO\ LIRQH WDNHV LQWR
DFFRXQWSXUFKDVLQJSRZHUSDULW\ZKLFKUHÀHFWVWKHGLIIHUHQFHLQSULFHOHYHOVEHWZHHQGLI-
ferent countries. Judged by these criteria, the hypothesis regarding convergence, taking into 
DFFRXQWWKHUHODWLYH*'3RISDUWLFXODUFRXQWULHVKDVEHHQFRQ¿UPHG+RZHYHUWKHPDMRULW\
of developing countries, including those with relatively low incomes, have low rates of eco-
nomic growth that are unstable over long time periods, which prevents them from catching 
up with the developed countries. In the case of these countries, the hypothesis of convergence 
KDVQRWEHHQFRQ¿UPHG
3. New trends in macroeconomic policy
The governments of the developed countries have resorted to macroeconomic measures 
IRU VWLPXODWLQJJURZWK LQFOXGLQJ VRPH WKDW FRXOG EH GHVFULEHG DV ³QRQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ RU
HYHQ³H[RWLF´7KHVHLQFOXGHDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\VRIWPRQHWDU\SROLF\LQWKHIRUPRITXDQWLWD-
WLYH HDVLQJ WKH WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI FHQWUDO EDQN UH¿QDQFLQJPHFKDQLVPV IURP LQVWUXPHQWV
for increasing liquidity to instruments for funding the operations of commercial banks, and 
LQWHUHVWUDWHVWKDWDUHHLWKHUFORVHWR]HURRUQHJDWLYH7KHVHPHDVXUHVDUHLQWHQGHGWRIUHHXS
¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVWRUHYLYHLQYHVWPHQWDFWLYLW\*LYHQORZOHYHOVRILQÀDWLRQDQGWKHULVN
RIRWKHUZLVHIDOOLQJLQWRDGHÀDWLRQDU\VSLUDO WKHVHPHDVXUHVKDYHEHHQMXGJHGSROLWLFDOO\
acceptable,  although the questions of whether they will be effective in the long term and 
ZKHWKHUWKH\ZLOOHQWDLOWKHULVNRI¿QDQFLDOGHVWDELOL]DWLRQUHPDLQRSHQ
First, we need to understand how long the policy of quantitative easing can be applied 
and the extent to which ending this policy will result in reducing growth rates and possibly 
risking a recession. Second, the long-term consequences of such a monetary policy, which to 
DVLJQL¿FDQWGHJUHHUXQVFRXQWHUWRWKHORJLFDQGH[SHULHQFHRIPRQHWDU\UHVWUDLQWWKDWSUH-
YDLOHGLQWKHGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVIURPWRIROORZLQJWKHVWDJÀDWLRQRIWKHV
are unknown. In the present circumstances, there is a risk of being caught in an unusual 
mone tary policy trap: governments will respond to low rates of growth by reducing interest 
UDWHVEXWZKHQDWWKH¿UVWVLJQRIDQXSWXUQLQHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\WKH\LQFUHDVHLQWHUHVWUDWHV
WKLVZLOOKDYHWKHHIIHFWRIRQFHDJDLQGULYLQJJURZWKUDWHVGRZQZDUGWRZDUG]HUR$SSO\LQJ
WKHK\SRWKHVLVRI-RKQ0D\QDUG.H\QHVZHFDQGHVFULEHWKLVVFHQDULRDVD³OLTXLGLW\WUDS´
$VWKLQJVVWDQGKRZHYHUWKHSUREOHPKDVQRWEHHQVXI¿FLHQWO\VWXGLHG
Running in parallel is the debate over the appropriateness and viability of a soft budget-
ary policy. The majority of developed countries have responded to high levels of debt and/or 
EXGJHWGH¿FLWVE\OLPLWLQJRUHYHQUHGXFLQJEXGJHWH[SHQGLWXUH+RZHYHU¿VFDOFRQVHUYD-
WLVPLQFXUVVLJQL¿FDQWVRFLRHFRQRPLFULVNVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQWVRIDQXPEHURIGHYHORSHG
countries have refrained from introducing such measures.
What is also unclear is whether budgetary policy can be used to stimulate economic 
growth (this is the debate over the role of budgetary austerity). The governments of some 
GHYHORSHG FRXQWULHV KDYH UHVSRQGHG WR DVHYHUH ¿VFDO FULVLV E\ DSSO\LQJ WUDGLWLRQDO DQWL
cyclical measures of increased budgetary expenditure. There is no consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of this policy. 
(PSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWVWKDWUHGXFLQJEXGJHWLPEDODQFHVFDQUHVXOWLQDQLPSURYH-
ment in economic performance. This is at least the experience of the United Kingdom and the 
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8QLWHG6WDWHVZKHUHPHDVXUHVKDYHEHHQWDNHQWRUHGXFHEXGJHWGH¿FLWVDQGZKHUHWKHUHVXOW
has been a reduction in unemployment and an increase in growth rates.
(XURSHDQH[SHULHQFHDOVRVKRZVWKDWFRXQWULHVWKDWKDYHLPSOHPHQWHGDSROLF\RIVWULFW
budgetary restraint have been the most successful, politically and economically (this includes 
WKH8.DQG*HUPDQ\EXWDOVR*UHHFHDQG3RUWXJDO%\FRQWUDVWWKHHFRQRPLHVRIHXUR]RQH
countries that have not sought to balance their budgets (primarily France and Italy) are on 
the brink of recession.
At the same time, the majority of countries that sharply increased public expenditures 
QHYHUWKHOHVVDGRSWHGPHDVXUHV WRUHGXFH WKHLUEXGJHWGH¿FLWVDQG WKHLUVRYHUHLJQGHEW ,Q
monetary policy the key dilemma is how to move away from the unconventional forms of 
PRQHWDU\SROLF\WKDWZHUHDGRSWHGGXULQJWKHFULVLVZLWKWKHREMHFWLYHRIVWDELOL]LQJWKH¿QDQ-
cial markets. It seems that the regulators in developed countries will proceed with extreme 
caution in implementing anti-crisis measures, reducing the volume of support proportionate 
to the recovery in economic activity and growth in the money multiplier.
In the debate over current macro-economic policy and growth stimulation, four topics 
stand out. First, the measures being implemented are anti-crisis measures, that is, they are 
primarily directed toward mitigating the crisis and do not contribute to solving the structural 
problems that gave rise to the crisis. This is abundantly clear from the fact that demand for 
credit is extremely low, even where there are negative interest rates. In other words, the low 
OHYHORIHFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\LVEHLQJLQÀXHQFHGE\XQFHUWDLQW\IRUUHDVRQVWKDWDUHVWUXFWXUDO
technological, and, in some cases, socio-political). 
Second, notwithstanding the current fashion for macro-economic experimentation, the 
FODVVLFDOWHFKQLTXHVRIPDFURHFRQRPLFPDQDJHPHQWSXUVXLQJDORZOHYHORILQÀDWLRQDQG
DORZEXGJHWGH¿FLW WKHOLEHUDOL]DWLRQRIWUDGHDQGGHUHJXODWLRQUHPDLQUHOHYDQWDVPHD-
VXUHVIRUWKHSURPRWLRQRIVXVWDLQDEOHJURZWKLQWKHORQJWHUP7KH³:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV´
VKRXOGWKHUHIRUHQRWEHDEDQGRQHGEXWUDWKHUPRGL¿HG
Third, the policy of quantitative easing is being most successfully applied in those count-
ULHVUHJLRQVZKHUHWKHLUFXUUHQFLHVVHUYHDVUHVHUYHFXUUHQFLHV²LQRWKHUZRUGVWKH\DUHLQ
demand throughout the world.
Fourth, these extraordinary measures cannot automatically be applied by other countries, 
least of all by developing countries. The scope for adopting soft budgetary and monetary 
SROLFLHVLVGHWHUPLQHGQRWRQO\E\WKHGHSWKRIWKHFULVLVEXWDOVRE\WKHVSHFL¿FHFRQRPLF
circumstances of a particular country and by the amount of credibility the policy of that 
country enjoys.
The standard principles and techniques of macroeconomic management remain relevant 
for emerging markets. If they apply a non-standard monetary policy, the risks for their econo-
mies will be much greater. 
One important lesson to be learned from the experience of developed countries is that 
QRQFRQYHQWLRQDOPRQHWDU\SROLFLHVKDYHQRWUHVXOWHGLQLQÀDWLRQ,QHPHUJLQJHFRQRPLHV
WKHSLFWXUHLVPXFKPRUHYDULHGEDFNJURXQGLQÀDWLRQLVKLJKHUDQGWKHLUHFRQRPLHVKDYHQRW
UHVSRQGHGVRÀH[LEO\WRDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHPRQH\VXSSO\)LJV±,WZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEH
dangerous for developing countries to draw the conclusion that they can abandon the basic 
SULQFLSOHVRIWKH³:DVKLQJWRQ&RQVHQVXV´WKDWLVLJQRUHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIPDFURHFRQRPLF
stability and the creation of a favorable investment climate.
+RZHYHUWKHPDWWHUFDQQRWUHVWWKHUH7KHFULVLVKDVVKRZQWKDWSULFHVWDELOLW\DQGRXWSXW
VWDELOLW\GRQRWQHFHVVDULO\JXDUDQWHH¿QDQFLDOVWDELOLW\HFRQRPLFDJHQWVDUHEHFRPLQJPRUH
LQFOLQHGWRZDUGULVN,WLVQRZHYLGHQWWKDWWKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVH[HUWDJUHDWHULQÀXHQFHRQ
economic activity than was previously thought. Against this background, some of the guide-
lines and goals of economic policies that are intended to stimulate growth must also be changed.
7KHLQÀDWLRQWDUJHW,WKDVEHHQSURSRVHGWKDW WKH LQÀDWLRQWDUJHWIRUDVWDEOHHFRQRP\
should be increased from 2% to approximately 4%. This represents a substantial change in 
our understanding of the macroeconomic foundations of economic growth.
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&XUUHQF\FRQWURO7KHUHLVGHEDWHRYHUWKHOLPLWVWROLEHUDOL]LQJPRQHWDU\SROLF\LQFOXGLQJ
the introduction of currency controls (particularly for capital account transactions), in spe-
FLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV'XULQJWKHODVWIHZGHFDGHVUHJXODWRU\SROLFLHVIRUFURVVERUGHU¿QDQFLDO
ÀRZVKDYHHYROYHGLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIJUHDWHUOLEHUDOL]DWLRQDQGWKLVWUHQGZDVPRVWQRWDEOHLQ
GHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV+RZHYHUWKHHYHQWVRIUHFHQW\HDUVKDYHVKRZQWKDWOLEHUDOL]LQJFDSLWDO
PDUNHWVFDQLQFXUVLJQL¿FDQWULVNVDWWLPHVDQGWKLVVKRXOGQRWEHLJQRUHG7KHPDLQSUREOHP
manifests itself not in the scale but in the high volatility of cross-border capital movements.
$EROLVKLQJ³RIIVKRUH´ ]RQHVNeither developed nor developing countries are willing 
WR WROHUDWH RIIVKRUH ]RQHV DQ\ ORQJHU7KHVH ]RQHVKDYHEHHQ DWWUDFWLYH IRU WZR UHDVRQV
¿UVWWKHUHLVWKH¿VFDODGYDQWDJH²DQRIIVKRUHUHVLGHQFHSURYLGHVDPHDQVWRPLQLPL]HWD[
OLDELOLW\LQQDWLRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQVVHFRQGWKHUHDUHRSSRUWXQLWLHVWRPLQLPL]HEXVLQHVVULVNV
DQGWRFRQFHDOWKHLGHQWLW\RIWKH¿QDOEHQH¿FLDU\IRUUHDVRQVRISULYDWHRUHQWUHSUHQHXULDO
FRQ¿GHQWLDOLW\
7KH¿UVWSUREOHPLVXQLYHUVDODQGLVFRPPRQLQERWKGHYHORSHGDQGGHYHORSLQJHFRQR-
mies. It can be dealt with by tightening controls or by reducing taxation. The second problem 
mainly affects developing countries where political regimes are unstable or where the busi-
ness environment is poor. In this case, repressive measures can be applied, but it is preferable 
to improve the quality of the business environment. Otherwise, any concerted measures taken 
E\FRXQWULHVDJDLQVWRIIVKRUH]RQHVZLOOPRVWOLNHO\UHVXOWLQWKHUHORFDWLRQRIFRPSDQLHV
DZD\IURPVXFK]RQHVWRWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVUDWKHUWKDQUHWXUQWRWKHLU
QDWLRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQV7KHGHFLVLRQZRXOGGHSHQGXSRQDQHYDOXDWLRQRIWKHULVNSUR¿WWUDGH
offs in each individual case.
Fig. 3. Real policy interest rates (%).
6RXUFHV,0)2I¿FLDOVLWHVRIFHQWUDOEDQNV
Fig. 4.,QÀDWLRQ
6RXUFHIMF.
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Finally, in the debates over economic growth prospects, there are changes in the under-
standing of the problem of inequality. Whereas during recent decades this topic has been 
DSSURDFKHGPDLQO\ IURP DJOREDO SHUVSHFWLYH²LQ WHUPV RI UHODWLRQV EHWZHHQ GHYHORSHG
DQGGHYHORSLQJFRXQWULHV²LQHTXDOLW\LQWKHGHYHORSHGZRUOGLVQRZLQWKHFHQWHURIDWWHQ-
tion (Piketty, 2014). 
Two new sets of circumstances have drawn attention to this issue. First, the theoreti-
FDOIUDPHZRUNIRURXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJKDVEHHQSURYLGHGE\WKH³.X]QHWV&XUYH´K\SRWKHVLV
.X]QHWV7KHSUHYDLOLQJDVVXPSWLRQKDGEHHQWKDWRQFHDJLYHQOHYHORIHFRQRPLF
development has been reached, further development will attenuate the problem of inequality . 
7KLVK\SRWKHVLVKDVQRWEHHQHQWLUHO\ERUQHRXWE\GHWDLOHGHFRQRPLFVWXGLHV(YHQVR LW
would appear that in cases where the welfare of the population has increased proportionately 
with the growth of the economy, political upheaval has been avoided. This is in contrast 
ZLWK WKHFRQVHTXHQFHVRI LQHTXDOLW\GXULQJ WKH LQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQRI WKHQLQHWHHQWK WRHDUO\
twentieth centuries.
It has also been noted that the liberal economic model that has prevailed since the 1980s 
attaches priority to achieving economic growth on the assumption that this will automati-
cally lead to improvements in the welfare of all, irrespective of whether overall economic 
JURZWKDQGLQFUHDVHGZHOIDUHOHDGWRHLWKHUDQLQFUHDVHRUDUHGXFWLRQLQLQHTXDOLW\+RZ-
ever, research over the last 10 years indicates that contemporary developed societies have 
EHFRPHPRUHSRODUL]HGDQGWKDWWKLVSRODUL]DWLRQKDVEHFRPHDVWUXFWXUDOIDFWRULQKLELWLQJ
economic growth.6 Clearly, these questions will be at the center of political and economic 
GHEDWHLQWKHQHDUIXWXUH7KH.X]QHWVK\SRWKHVLVPXVWEHUHH[DPLQHGWRXQGHUVWDQGKRZ
relevant it is to the relationship between economic growth and levels of inequality in cases 
where developed countries depart from the traditional industrial society and undergo radical 
structural change.
4. Globalization and global imbalances
*OREDOL]DWLRQKDVEHHQWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGHYHORSPHQWLQUHFHQWGHFDGHV,WKDVVLPXO-
taneously been a contributing factor toward economic growth and a consequence of that 
growth. It has also been linked to both socio-economic successes and socio-economic 
failures . The unprecedented economic growth during the 1990s, the global crisis that erupted 
in 2008, and social stagnation that has been accompanied by growing inequality have all been 
DWWULEXWHGWRJOREDOL]DWLRQ,WLVQRWWKHSXUSRVHRIWKLVDUWLFOHWRH[DPLQHWKHVRFLRSROLWLFDO
DQGHFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHVRIJOREDOL]DWLRQ5DWKHUZHVKDOODVNKRZVWDEOHWKHWUHQGWR-
ZDUGJOREDOL]DWLRQLVZKDWLPSDFWWKHZRUOGFULVLVKDVKDGRQWKLVWUHQGDQGKRZORQJLWZLOO
continue in the post-crisis period.
7ZRDVSHFWVRIWKHJOREDOL]DWLRQWUHQGQHHGWREHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWWKHFRQMXQFWXUDOWKH
SUREOHPRILPEDODQFHVRUDVVHW³EXEEOHV´DQGWKHVWUXFWXUDOWHFKQRORJLFDO2QWKHHYHRI
and at the beginning of the recent global crisis, a number of economists took the view that 
global imbalances were the principal factors underlying the crisis. Attention was drawn, in 
particular, to the division of the world between countries that consumed and countries that 
VDYHG7KHWHUP³&KLPHULFD´ZDVFRLQHGWRFRQWUDVWWKHFRQVXPHUERRPLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
(arguably in the West as a whole) with the powerful propensity to save in China and other 
developing Asian countries. 
One need to understand whether these imbalances can be overcome or whether, after 
some attenuation, they will once again increase for reasons that might include the application 
of anti- crisis measures (above all, the policy of quantitative easing), which themselves are 
FDSDEOHRIJLYLQJULVHWRQHZSUREOHPVLQÀDWLRQDQG³EXEEOHV´7KLVOHDGVWRWKHUHODWHG
 6 For the debate over inequality, see Journal of Economic Perspectives (2013), vol. 27, no. 30 (in particular, 
$OYDUHGRHWDO0DQNLZ&RUDN%RQLFDHWDO
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TXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHULWZLOODWDOOEHSRVVLEOHWRQHXWUDOL]HWKHVHLPEDODQFHVDQGEDODQFHWKH
world market by means of global regulation.7
$NH\TXHVWLRQFRQFHUQVWKHIXWXUHRIJOREDOL]DWLRQUHODWLYHWRWHFKQRORJLFDOLQQRYDWLRQ
We know that where there is socio-economic progress, increased welfare leads to an increase 
in the cost of labor in the leading developing countries. These countries have become less 
competitive relative to developed countries, at least with regard to labor costs. This trend, 
combined with the latest technological development (reduction in the share of physical labor 
LQWKHPRVWPRGHUQSURGXFWVZLOOVLJQL¿FDQWO\FRQWULEXWHWRDUHGXFWLRQRIJURZWKUDWHVLQ
world trade (Ulyukaev, 2014).
Now these countries will have to consider institutional improvements in the business 
environ ment if they are to remain competitive. The importance of exchanging goods between 
countries is diminishing, as is, correspondingly, the distinction between countries that con-
VXPHDQGFRXQWULHVWKDWVDYH(PHUJLQJPDUNHWVPXVWLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQFHQWUDWHQRWVRPXFK
on supporting exports (which is, of course, important, and support can even be increased) but 
on improving the quality of the business environment, irrespective of the markets particular 
businesses serve. Moreover, as the level of welfare in developing countries increases, the 
domestic markets in these countries will become not less but more important for their growth 
prospects than the markets of developed countries.
In this way, increased costs in the emergency economies (principally labor costs), on the one 
hand, and increased internal demand, on the other, can become contributing factors in slowing the 
rate of growth in world trade and even in promoting a certain reduction in world trade turnover.
7KHUH LVQRWKLQJXQXVXDODERXW WKLV7KHUHZHUHSHULRGVRIGHJOREDOL]DWLRQGXULQJ WKH
VDQGVDQGLQWKHPLGGOHRIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\3HULRGVRIJOREDOL]DWLRQVHHP
WRDOWHUQDWHZLWKSHULRGVRIGHJOREDOL]DWLRQ,QJHQHUDOWKHH[SHULHQFHRIWKHSDVW\HDUV
VXJJHVWV WKDW LWZRXOG EH DPLVWDNH WR UHJDUG JOREDOL]DWLRQ DV DOLQHDU SURFHVV 6LQFH WKH
beginning of the twentieth century, there have been several phases of advance and retreat in 
WKHSURFHVVHVRIJOREDOL]DWLRQDQGHYHU\WLPHLWKDVEHHQDVVXPHGWKDWWKHSUHYDLOLQJWUHQG
ZRXOGODVWLQGH¿QLWHO\8
$QDO\]LQJFRQWHPSRUDU\HFRQRPLFWUHQGVGRHVQRWHQDEOHXVWRUHDFKDQ\FOHDUFXWFRQ-
FOXVLRQUHJDUGLQJGHJOREDOL]DWLRQ)LJ+RZHYHUZHFDQGUDZDWWHQWLRQWRDQXPEHURI
important trends, some of which may be long-term. They are related to the dynamics of the 
PDUNHWLQJRRGVDQGWRWKHG\QDPLFVRIWKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHW
7KHJURZWKUDWHVLQZRUOGWUDGHDUHVORZLQJGRZQ&HUWDLQO\LQDQDO\]LQJWKHDFFHOHUDWLRQ
of the 2000s and the slowing during the 2010s, we need to take into account the price factor 
 7 5HJDUGLQJWKHUHJXODWRU\FKDOOHQJHVSUHVHQWHGE\JOREDOL]DWLRQ'DQL5RGULNZURWHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHJOREDO
FULVLV ³$OWKRXJK HFRQRPLF JOREDOL]DWLRQ KDV HQDEOHG XQSUHFHGHQWHG OHYHOV RI SURVSHULW\ LQ DGYDQFHG FRXQWULHV
and has been a boon to hundreds of millions of poor workers in China and elsewhere in Asia, it rests on shaky 
pillars. Unlike national markets, which tend to be supported by domestic regulatory and political institutions, global 
PDUNHWVDUHRQO\³ZHDNO\HPEHGGHG´7KHUHLVQRJOREDODQWLWUXVWDXWKRULW\QRJOREDOOHQGHURIODVWUHVRUWQRJOREDO
regulator, no global safety nets, and, of course, no global democracy. In other words, global markets suffer from 
ZHDNJRYHUQDQFHDQGWKHUHIRUHIURPZHDNSRSXODUOHJLWLPDF\´5RGULN7KHVHLVVXHVDUHWUHDWHGLQGHWDLO
in Rodrik (2011a. Ch. 10). See also Ulyukaev (2014. Ch. 1).
 8 6XPPLQJ XS WKH UHVXOWV RI WKH SUHZDU HFRQRPLF FULVLV -RKQ 0D\QDUG .H\QHV ZURWH LQ  ³:KDW
an extraordinary episode in the economic progress of man that age was which came to an end in August, 1914! 
«7KHLQKDELWDQWRI/RQGRQFRXOGRUGHUE\WHOHSKRQHVLSSLQJKLVPRUQLQJWHDLQEHGWKHYDULRXVSURGXFWVRIWKH
ZKROHHDUWKLQVXFKTXDQWLW\DVKHPLJKWVHH¿WDQGUHDVRQDEO\H[SHFWWKHLUHDUO\GHOLYHU\XSRQKLVGRRUVWHSKH
could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises 
of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; 
or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial 
PXQLFLSDOLW\LQDQ\FRQWLQHQWWKDWIDQF\RULQIRUPDWLRQPLJKWUHFRPPHQG+HFRXOGVHFXUHIRUWKZLWKLIKHZLVKHG
LWFKHDSDQGFRPIRUWDEOHPHDQVRIWUDQVLWWRDQ\FRXQWU\RUFOLPDWHZLWKRXWSDVVSRUWRURWKHUIRUPDOLW\´%XWKH
ZHQWRQWRQRWH³%XWPRVWLPSRUWDQWRIDOOKHUHJDUGHGWKLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUVDVQRUPDOFHUWDLQDQGSHUPDQHQW
H[FHSWLQWKHGLUHFWLRQRIIXUWKHULPSURYHPHQWDQGDQ\GHYLDWLRQIURPLWDVDEHUUDQWVFDQGDORXVDQGDYRLGDEOH´
(Keynes, 1919. Ch. 2).
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and the effect of double accounting. In other words, rapid changes in the prices for raw mate-
ULDOVFRXOGDUWL¿FLDOO\LQÀDWHWKHYROXPHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH0RUHRYHUWKHVORZGRZQWKDW
was observable in 2012–2013 was probably due to a weakness in demand and deterioration 
LQWKHFRQGLWLRQVIRU¿QDQFLQJWUDGH
There was some contraction in the volume of direct cross-border investments, but there 
is no single explanation for this. The large-scale growth in these investments was one of the 
main features of world economic development toward the end of the 1990s and 2000s and 
DVRXUFH RI WKH DFFHOHUDWHG HFRQRPLF JURZWK WKDW FKDUDFWHUL]HG WKH GHFDGH SUHFHGLQJ WKH
FULVLV1RZGHVSLWHWKHKLJKYRODWLOLW\RIVXFKLQYHVWPHQWÀRZVWKH\WHQGWRRVFLOODWHDURXQG
the level that has been attained: the average annual volume of global foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) from 2005–2012 was approximately 1.5 trillion USD. The relationship between 
developed and developing countries as recipients in the aggregate volume of investments is 
changing: whereas the share of developing countries in all world FDIs was 20% in 2000, it 
was 50% in 2009 and 60% in 2012. In the post-crisis period, the level of investment in the 
developing countries of Asia and Latin America has recovered and even increased. The de-
veloped countries remain the principal provider of foreign investments, although their share 
KDVIDOOHQIURPDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVWRLQ(YHQVRWKH\FRQWLQXHWR
dominate as before.
At the same time, the cross-border movement of capital between advanced countries has 
FRQWUDFWHG:KHUHDVLQ¿QDQFLDOÀRZVEHWZHHQWKH*FRXQWULHVDPRXQWHGWRRI
their aggregate GDP, this amount has now fallen below 4.5%, and for the entire world econo-
P\WKHVHÀRZVKDYHGHFUHDVHGE\/XQGHWDO$WNLQVDQG)UD\2IFRXUVH
some economists interpret this as a strengthening in the stability of the world economy and as 
DQH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHZHOONQRZQGLOHPPDRIZKHWKHUWRFKRRVHEHWZHHQ³VWDELOLW\WKDWIHQGV
RIIWKHFULVLV´RU³JURZWKWKDWEULQJVLWIRUZDUG´7KHSULFHRIVWDELOLW\LIVXFKWKHUHLVFRXOG
be a long-term slow-down in economic development.
7KHUHKDVEHHQDQRWLFHDEOHLQFUHDVHLQWKH³GHPDQG´IRUSURWHFWLRQLVWSROLFLHVDQGLQWKH
propagation of protectionist ideology, albeit not in the crude form of trade restrictions and 
high tariffs, which would be in violation of WTO requirements. Such measures, introduced 
GXULQJWKHFULVLVSHULRGDFFRXQWIRUQRPRUHWKDQRIZRUOGWUDGH(YHQVRTXDOLWDWLYH
EDUULHUV UHIHUUHG WR DV ³SHUPLVVLYH´ HJ SK\WRVDQLWDU\ DQG HFRORJLFDO DUH LQFUHDVLQJO\
EHLQJDSSOLHG7KHUHLVDQHZWUHQGWRZDUGWKH³UHJLRQDOL]DWLRQRIJOREDOL]DWLRQ´WKDWLVDQ
Fig. 5. World trade in goods and services in value and physical terms.
([SRUWYDOXHRIJRRGVDQGVHUYLFHVLQFXUUHQWSULFHVDVDSURSRUWLRQRI*'3DSSO\LQJH[FKDQJHUDWHV 
6RXUFHV:RUOG%DQN:RUOG'HYHORSPHQW,QGLFDWRUV([SRUWTXRWD²HVWLPDWHVRI7$OLHY
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increase in the number of free-trade agreements (Fig. 6). It is likely that the WTO system 
ZLOOEHWUDQVIRUPHGE\WKHIRUPDWLRQRI³LQWHUHVWJURXSV´WKLVZRXOGHQWDLODEDQGRQLQJWKH
unanimity principle as countries begin to form groups for particular purposes, including spe-
FL¿FVHFWRULQWHUHVWV7KLVZRXOGVLJQDODFKDQJHLQWKHIRUHLJQHFRQRPLFSROLF\PRGHORIWKH
advanced countries.
The real magnitude of the contemporary economy, and thus its external economic activity, 
is measured not so much by the volume of exports and imports as by the amount of value 
added within the system of global value chains (GVCs). It is vital when developing a foreign 
economic strategy that is appropriate for present-day conditions, to insert the economy into 
these chains, to increase the share of value added created by national companies and the 
competitiveness of national production, and to employ such methods as locating production 
LQ³ORZFRVW´FRXQWULHVDQGLPSRUWLQJORZFRVWFRPSRQHQWV7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHJRDOVDQG
mechanisms of foreign economic trade, as a factor contributing to economic growth, will 
KDYHWREHUHGH¿QHG
The regulation of foreign trade must change, as must attitudes toward imports. Strate-
gies based on export-oriented growth and protection against imports are no longer com-
patible. In both spheres, the key issue becomes the international competitiveness of 
produc tion. The very concept of protectionism must change. Rather than think in terms 
RI SURWHFWLQJ WKH QDWLRQDO SURGXFHU ORFDWHGZLWKLQ DFRXQWU\¶V WHUULWRU\ ZHPXVW WKLQN
in terms of defending trans-national producers and supporting their interests throughout 
the global value chain. This means that border and internal barriers, the management of 
techno logy, the defense of intellectual property rights, competition, and access to the mar-
kets of countries that participate in the value chain will become important instruments for 
supporting  national companies and enhancing their competitive advantage. The protection 
RIWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\ZLOOEHXQGHUVWRRGDVWKHSURWHFWLRQRIRQH¶VRZQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQ
the global chains of value creation.
5. The trend toward re-industrialization
$QRWKHULPSRUWDQWUHFHQWWUHQGWKHUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQRIGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVFRXOGDOVR
EHFRPH DIDFWRU WKDW FRQWULEXWHV WR GHJOREDOL]DWLRQ2YHU WKH ODVW  \HDUV WKH VKDUH RI
 industry in GDP and employment in these countries has generally been falling, and this has 
also been the case in post-Communist Russia. Critics of contemporary capitalism have de-
VFULEHGWKLVDVGHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQZKHUHDVRWKHUUHVHDUFKHUVKDYHLQWHUSUHWHGWKLVWUHQGDV
the formation of a post-industrial economy and society. 
6HYHUDO IDFWRUVFRXOGEHFRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH UHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQRIZKLFK WKH LQFUHDV-
ing cost of labor in developing countries is not necessarily the most important. After all, 
Fig. 6. Number of Regional Trade Agreements.
6RXUFHWTO Regional Trade Agreements Information System (http://rtais.wto.org/ UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx).
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there are many poor and relatively stable countries to where production can be relocated 
WRPLQLPL]HFRVWV5HLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQLIWKLVWUHQGGRHVLQGHHGEHFRPHHVWDEOLVKHGLVWR
be understood not as the reintroduction of traditional forms of production in the developed 
countries but as the formation of new branches of industry. The distinguishing feature is 
a relative reduction of labor in the cost structure and an increase in the weight of factors 
such as the proximity of the research base (given the increased proportion of R&D costs) 
and basic consumer demand). The increasing cost of labor in the emerging economies, has 
FRQWULEXWHGWRWKLVSURFHVVRQO\WRDOLPLWHGGHJUHH(JDZD
$VLJQL¿FDQWWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWKHPDUNHWIRUHQHUJ\UHVRXUFHVFRXOGEHFRPHDQLPSRU-
WDQWIDFWRUFRQWULEXWLQJWRUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQ7KHUHKDVEHHQDQRWLFHDEOHUHGXFWLRQLQWKH
cost of energy, and this can be attributed both to recent technological innovations in the ex-
WUDFWLRQRIQRQFRQYHQWLRQDOIRUPVRIRLODQGJDVDQGWRDVLJQL¿FDQWH[SDQVLRQRIWKHPHDQV
of transportation.
No less important is the proximity of the sales market. Nowadays when products are in-
creasingly targeted at individual consumption, the proximity of the consumer has become an 
important factor in acquiring a competitive advantage. The proximity of developers of new 
products and technologies has also gained increasing importance, especially in the advanced 
countries. The analysis of new industries will also gain increasing importance as a means of 
identifying new technologies that will drive economic growth in the post-crisis period.
7UHQGVWRZDUGUHLQGXVWULDOL]DWLRQFDQQRW\HWEHVWDWLVWLFDOO\YHUL¿HGEXWWKHUHDUHDQXP-
ber of examples (mainly in the United States) of a return to production by industrial enter-
prises that were closed down many years ago. One example is the revival of pipeline produc-
tion for the shale oil and gas industries in the United States.
In these circumstances, industrial policy must acquire a new rationale. It should no longer 
EHDTXHVWLRQRI³LGHQWLI\LQJZLQQHUV´RURIDOORFDWLQJEXGJHWUHVRXUFHVWRVXSSRUWSDUWLFXODU
sectors or enterprises but rather of creating an institutional framework that will be conducive 
to the emergence of new sectors of the economy. 
6. Causes and components of the Russian crisis
%\WKHHQGRIDQGWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\VKRZHGGLVWLQFWVLJQV
RIDFULVLVIROORZLQJDJUHDWHUWKDQGURSLQRLOSULFHVIURP±86'EEOLQWKH¿UVW
half of 2014 to 48–49 USD/bbl on certain days in December 2014 and January 2015). In 
 December, the exchange rate of the Russian national currency fell by approximately 50%, and 
DQQXDOL]HGLQÀDWLRQLQFUHDVHGWR)RUWKH¿UVWWLPHVLQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHVWKH
real income of the population is decreasing, and GDP growth rates are likely to be negative in 
$OOWKLVZDVKDSSHQLQJDWWKHWLPHWKHHFRQRPLFDQG¿QDQFLDOVDQFWLRQVWKH86DQGWKH
(8LQWURGXFHGDJDLQVW5XVVLDZHUHUDWFKHWHGXS5XVVLD¶VLQYHVWPHQWUDWLQJZDVGRZQJUDGHG
E\WKHZRUOGUDWLQJDJHQFLHVDQGWKHUHZDVDPDVVLYHFDSLWDORXWÀRZIURP5XVVLD
The events that occurred around the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 were a most 
vivid manifestation of the more general problems directly impacting the possibility of se-
FXULQJVXVWDLQDEOHJURZWKLQ5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\7KHVHZHUHORQJVLPPHULQJSUREOHPVWKDW
FUHDWHGJURXQGVIRUDPDMRUFULVLVJLYHQWKHFRLQFLGHQFHRIDQXPEHURIIDFWRUV+RZHYHU
the 2014–2015 situation is far different in terms of its nature and mechanisms from previous 
crises suffered by the Russian economy.
The crisis faced by Russia in 1998 was primarily a standard debt crisis fueled by a lack of 
¿VFDOGLVFLSOLQHDQGE\FRQWLQXLQJVRIWEXGJHWFRQVWUDLQWVLQFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKDUDWKHUWLJKW
monetary policy. As is known from theory (Krugman, 1979), such a combination of factors 
OHDGVWRD¿UVWJHQHUDWLRQFXUUHQF\FULVLVZKLFKLVH[DFWO\ZKDWKDSSHQHGLQ5XVVLDLQ
The drop in oil prices, which reached the bottom after a 75% drop in the nominal ruble rate 
(winter of 1998–1999), had a restricted effect on the development of the crisis. If oil prices 
had not dropped, the debt and the currency crises might have occurred somewhat later, but 
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they could not be avoided without balancing the budget and maintaining an equilibrium ex-
FKDQJHUDWH7KLVZDVLQIDFWGHPRQVWUDWHGE\VLPLODUFULVHVLQ%UD]LODQG$UJHQWLQDZLWKWKH
¿UVWDSSHDULQJWREHOHVVDQGWKHVHFRQGPRUHVHYHUHWKDQWKHVLWXDWLRQLQ5XVVLDDWWKDWWLPH
(see: Mau, 1998; Ulyukaev, 1999).
Such crisis characteristics in developing countries required well-known countermeasures. 
7KHVDQGVSURYLGHGVXI¿FLHQWFRQYLQFLQJH[SHULHQFHLQRYHUFRPLQJVXFKDFULVLV
*LYHQDVRXQGPDFURHFRQRPLFSROLF\DQGVXSSRUWIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDO¿QDQFLDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
LWZRXOGWDNHDWPRVWWZR\HDUVWRHPHUJHIURPWKHFULVLVDQGWKLVSHULRGZDVVXI¿FLHQWWR
UHJDLQIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUFRQ¿GHQFHLQ5XVVLD
+RZHYHUWKH¿QDQFLDOFULVLVLQ5XVVLDLQKDGDQLPSRUWDQWGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHLWFR-
incided with the end of the transformation crisis, i.e., the transition from a planned system 
WRDPDUNHWGULYHQRQH,QFRQMXQFWLRQZLWKPDFURHFRQRPLFVWDELOL]DWLRQ LWKHOSHGUHYLYH
HFRQRPLFJURZWKZKLFKDW¿UVWZDVDUHFRYHU\JURZWK0DX,QRWKHUZRUGVE\WKH
end of the 1990s, Russia was through with economic and political troubles (downturns), and 
in fact, the nature of the economic recession as such was quite simple and well-known from 
SULRUH[SHULHQFHZLWKPDFURHFRQRPLFGHVWDELOL]DWLRQLQYDULRXVFRXQWULHVERWKGHYHORSHG
and developing). Therefore, an important factor for the bailout was restoring political and 
macroeconomic stability, and the growth was fueled by the huge production and human capi-
WDOUHVRXUFHVUHVXOWLQJIURPDGURSLQ5XVVLD¶V*'3IURPWR
In 2008 and 2009, the crisis in Russia developed in economic terms according to a more so-
phisticated model with both internal and external components. On the one hand, it was a global 
economic crisis that was especially apparent in developed countries. In the autumn of 2008, 
5XVVLDVXIIHUHGWKHHIIHFWRIµEHLQJLQIHFWHG¶E\WKHFULVLVLQWKHJOREDO¿QDQFLDOV\VWHPDQGWKH
ensuing slump in global demand for the basic commodities of Russian export, pri marily raw 
commodities and their primary processing products (part of the investment demand).
On the other hand, by the middle of 2008, signs appeared of a crisis in the growth model 
that had been used in the 2000s and that was based on demand expansion (determined in the 
case in question by rapid growth in the rental income from the fuel and energy sectors). The 
fall in oil prices from 145 to 37 USD/bbl during 2008–2009 was critical for the economy, 
ZKLFKZDVREYLRXVO\µRYHUKHDWHG¶DVGHPRQVWUDWHG LQXQHTXDOO\KLJKZDJHVDGHFOLQH LQ
unemployment below the natural rate, an overvalued exchange rate for the national currency, 
DQGDKXJHIRUHLJQGHEW+RZHYHUFRQVLGHUDEOHJROGIRUHLJQFXUUHQF\DQGEXGJHWUHVHUYHV
VLJQL¿FDQWO\PLWLJDWHGWKHDFXWHSKDVHRIWKHFULVLVDQGKHOSHGSURSXSWKHHFRQRP\XQWLORLO
prices returned to a reasonable level (at the end of 2009).
In 2014 and 2015, Russia faced three crisis components simultaneously: structural, cycli-
cal (internal market), and external.
First, this is a crisis in structural growth rates, which conventionally implies potential 
growth rates at the existing level of technologies and entrepreneurship (the total factor pro-
ductivity, TFP), with a full effective (considering the existing spare capacity, the technical and 
PRUDODJLQJRI¿[HGDVVHWVFDSLWDOORDGDQGDQDWXUDOQRWDFFHOHUDWLQJLQÀDWLRQUDWHRIXQHP-
SOR\PHQWPDLQWDLQHGLQWKHHFRQRP\$FFRUGLQJWRHVWLPDWHVE\WKH*DLGDU,QVWLWXWHIRU(FR-
nomic Policy, the structural rates of Russian GDP growth fell from approximately 4.0–5.0% 
annually during the 2000s to 1.0–1.5% in 2014, and are expected to continue decreasing in 
VHHEHORZ,QRWKHUZRUGVLQWKHODVW±\HDUV5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\KDVEHHQORVLQJ
3–4 p.p. of GDP growth per year (Sinelnikov-Murylev et al., 2014).
Second, this is also an internal cyclical business crisis. The characteristic features of this 
type of crisis are the following: a decrease in the growth rates of investments; a slowdown 
LQWKHJURZWKRIEDQNORDQVWRWKHQRQ¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHSURSRUWLRQRIµEDG¶
debts for banks; an expansion of consumer demand by the population, as fueled by consum-
HUOHQGLQJDGHFOLQHLQWKHVKDUHRISUR¿WVLQWKHHFRQRP\DQGDUHGXFWLRQLQWKHQXPEHURI
VPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGEXVLQHVVHV7KH*DLGDU,QVWLWXWHKDVDOUHDG\EHHQUHFRUGLQJQHJD-
WLYHF\FOLFDOUDWHVLQ5XVVLD¶V*'3JURZWKVLQFHXSWR±SSD\HDU
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Third, the current crisis is connected with changes in external economic conditions 
(a trend reversal in oil prices). The tenuous point of fact that the crisis of 2008–2009 was 
apparently overcome without serious consequences was, in fact, due to the continuance of 
the previous Russian economic growth model, under which high growth rates are possible 
RQO\ZLWK FRQVWDQWO\ JURZLQJ RLO SULFHV7KHLU DFWXDO VWDELOL]DWLRQ LQ  XQWLO WKH¿UVW
half of 2014 at approximately 100 USD/bbl had already noticeably reduced the contribu-
WLRQRIWKHRLOLQGXVWU\WRWKHQDWLRQ¶V*'3)DOOLQJRLOSULFHVGURYHGRZQWKHIRUHLJQWUDGH
FRPSRQHQWRI*'3JURZWKWRSUDFWLFDOO\]HURLQDQGZLOODSSDUHQWO\PDNHDQHJDWLYH
contribution in 2015.
It is true, however, that unlike 2009, the demand for exports and world prices for other 
 Russian commodities, apart from oil, are practically unchanged, which compensates to some 
H[WHQWIRUWKHQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRIIDOOLQJRLOSULFHV+RZHYHUWKLVVKRXOGUDWKHUEHUHJDUGHGDV
an absence of any additional negative impact on the economy and even on individual sectors.
Furthermore, there has been an external shock due to the sanctions imposed on Russia, 
SULPDULO\ LQ WKH¿QDQFH VHFWRU7KH ODWWHUKDYHJUHDWO\GHVWDELOL]HGFDSLWDO G\QDPLFV DQG
WKHUHIRUHWKHHFRQRPLFG\QDPLFV7KHRXWÀRZRIFDSLWDOLVVLPXOWDQHRXVO\GXHWRERWKH[WHU-
QDOVKRFNV²WKHIDOOLQRLOSULFHVDQGWKHFXWRIIRI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\IURPDFFHVVLQJH[WHUQDO
¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWV
 &KDQQHOVRILQÀXHQFHIURPWKHVDQFWLRQVRQWKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\
:H FDQ VLQJOH RXW VHYHUDO FKDQQHOV RI LQÀXHQFH IURP WKH VDQFWLRQV RQ 5XVVLD¶V *'3
growth that are already having a negative effect, which will persist for two to three years. 
Among them is the increased economic and political uncertainty, an increase in the cost of 
borrowed funds, and restrictions on technology transfer as well as imports.
7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWFKDQQHORILQÀXHQFHZDVDsharp increase in uncertainty in the econo-
my and in politics, which affects decision-making by economic agents both within the country 
DQGZLWKUHVSHFWWR5XVVLDDEURDG7KHUHDUHWZRPHFKDQLVPVRIWKHLQÀXHQFHRIXQFHUWDLQW\
WKURXJKFRQVXPSWLRQDQGWKURXJKLQYHVWPHQWV/HWXVDQDO\]HWKHVHWZRLQPRUHGHWDLO
Consumption. The increase in economic and political uncertainty creates uncertainty about 
future income. As a result, according to the permanent income hypothesis, economic agents 
lower consumption in the present by augmenting savings to be able to level out potential 
LQFRPH DQG FRQVXPSWLRQ ÀXFWXDWLRQV LQ WKH IXWXUH )ULHGPDQ  %HUQDQNH  ,Q
WKHFRQWH[WRI5XVVLD¶VVSHFL¿FVLWXDWLRQORZFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHQDWLRQDOFXUUHQF\HFRQRPLF
SROLF\DQGEDQNLQJV\VWHPDORQJZLWKKLJKLQÀDWLRQDQGH[FKDQJHULVNVVXFKVDYLQJVDUH
made mainly in the form of foreign cash. This decreases the demand for real cash balances 
in rubles (due to the components of the transactional demand and the demand for a store of 
value) and increases the demand for real cash balances in foreign currency (due to the demand 
for a store of value and for precaution). 
7KLVOHDGVWRDVORZGRZQLQWKHDJJUHJDWHFRQVXPSWLRQGROODUL]DWLRQDQGLQÀDWLRQDF-
celeration. These processes could already be distinctly observed in the 1st and 4th quarters 
RIZKHQLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHLQFUHDVHGFDSLWDORXWÀRZIURPWKHFRXQWU\ZHREVHUYHG
reductions in the volumes of bank deposits and people started converting their savings from 
bank accounts to currency in cash and safe-deposit boxes (see Table 3).
Investments. The increased uncertainty about future income and output volumes raises 
the current cost of holding of capital and reduces its desired future volume. The investments 
needed to achieve this volume fall as a result, and businesses are only willing to implement 
those projects for which the guaranteed return exceeds the current increased cost of capital 
(interest). In this case, we speak precisely about increasing the risk premium within the in-
terest rate, subjectively perceived by economic agents, as an indicator of the relative return 
on (cost of) capital between the present and the future. Decreasing the nominal interest rate 
RQWKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWFDQQRWFKDQJHWKHLQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRURIEXVLQHVVHV7KH\ZRXOG
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choose to save money on accounts or in the form of liquid assets rather than make new invest-
PHQWVLQ¿[HGFDSLWDO
6LPLODUO\DVLVSURYHQE\VWDWLVWLFVWKHLQFUHDVHLQWKHNH\UDWHRIWKH5)&HQWUDO%DQN
and nominal rates at the end of 2014 had practically no effect on the lending volumes in the 
QRQ¿QDQFLDO VHFWRU WKHKLJKHU ULVNVKDGEHHQDQWLFLSDWHG LQDGYDQFH)RUDVKRUWSHULRG
the demand for ruble loans even increased due to replacing foreign currency loans (Fig. 7). 
+RZHYHUDVGHYDOXDWLRQH[SHFWDWLRQVJURZZHDNHUDQGLQÀDWLRQVODFNHQVZKLFKLVVXSSRVHG
to decrease the investment risks in real projects, the level of nominal rates will again become 
important on the lending market.
Let us recall that the diametrically opposed monetary policy pursued by several central 
EDQNVLQGHYHORSHGFRXQWULHVDIWHU WKHFULVLVRI)56(&%%DQNRI-DSDQEURXJKW
about similar results in terms of encouraging investment lending. Despite the extremely low 
or even negative interest rates, economic agents were unwilling to take out loans due to the 
KLJKXQFHUWDLQW\DERXWWKHJHQHUDOSURVSHFWVIRUHFRQRPLFJURZWKLQPDQ\(XURSHDQFRXQW
ULHVDQGGXHWRWKHVSHFL¿FVRIVWUXFWXUDOSULRULWLHVIRUSRVWFULVLVGHYHORSPHQW
$Q LPSRUWDQW FKDQQHO RI LQÀXHQFH IURP WKH VDQFWLRQV RQ WKH5XVVLDQ HFRQRP\ LV WKH
LQFUHDVHGFRVWRIERUURZHGIXQGLQJHVSHFLDOO\ORQJWHUPIXQGLQJ%HFDXVHPRVWRIWKHORQJ
term funds were borrowed in previous years on the external market, Russian borrowers suf-
fered not only from the direct increase in rates but also from the increased foreign exchange 
risk for loans in foreign currency. First, this channel reduces investment opportunities for 
businesses willing to make investments at the present moment, despite the mechanism of 
reducing the desired capital volume described above; second, it limits opportunities for re-
¿QDQFLQJFXUUHQWEXVLQHVVGHEWVZKLFKUHVWULFWV WKHLURSHUDWLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\PXVWGLYHUW
FXUUHQW¿QDQFLDOÀRZVWRUHSD\H[LVWLQJGHEWV
Table 3 
2XWÀRZRIFDSLWDODQGGROODUL]DWLRQRI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\LQ
Q1 Q4
1HWRXWÀRZRIFDSLWDOIURPWKHSULYDWHVHFWRU86'ELOOLRQV –47.8 –69.8
7UHQGVLQUXEOHEDQNDFFRXQWVKHOGE\WKHSRSXODWLRQ58%ELOOLRQV –798.8 –287.9
Trends in foreign cash, USD billions 10.4 17.4
6RXUFH&HQWUDO%DQNRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
Fig. 7.,QWHUHVWUDWHVDQGUDWHVRIJURZWKLQUXEOHORDQVWRQRQ¿QDQFLDORUJDQL]DWLRQV
6RXUFH&HQWUDO%DQNRIWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQ
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7KHWKLUGFKDQQHORILQÀXHQFHIURPWKHVDQFWLRQVLVWKHdecline in the total factor pro-
ductivity because there is no access to technology transfer from abroad and because of the 
reduction in foreign direct investments and the deterioration of competition with foreign 
producers (the latter on account of restrictions on foreign trade transactions on either side and 
the impact of price advantages due to the drop in the ruble exchange rate). At the same time, 
DPLGVWWKHGHFOLQHLQWKHZRUNLQJDJHSRSXODWLRQDQGLQFRPSOHWHUHSODFHPHQWRI¿[HGDVVHWV
the total factor productivity appears to be the only tool that can increase the structural annual 
economic growth rates from the present 1.0–1.5% range to at least 3.0–3.5%.
5HJDUGLQJRWKHUSRWHQWLDOFKDQQHOVRILQÀXHQFHIURPWKHVDQFWLRQVRQHVKRXOGPHQWLRQ
the effects from import restrictionsZLWKLQ5XVVLD,QDQXPEHURI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFVHFWRUV
the production of individual goods crucially depends on imported components that cannot 
be replaced, at least in the near term, for technical or technological reasons. This effect will 
persist regardless of whether this restriction is due to discrete decisions with respect to certain 
product categories or is the result of increased prices for imported goods due to devaluation. 
In particular, research shows that output trends will be materially  affected by a decline in the 
real ruble exchange rate for sectors such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles, textiles, apparel 
production, plastics and plastic products, equipment, electrical equipment and  machinery, 
DQGIXUQLWXUHVHH(YGRNLPRYDHWDO
$WWKHPRPHQWWKHEHJLQQLQJRILWLVGLI¿FXOWWRHYDOXDWHWKHGHJUHHRILQÀXHQFHE\
WKLVFKDQQHOEHFDXVHQRVWDWLVWLFVDUHDYDLODEOH+RZHYHUWKHH[LVWLQJULVHLQSULFHVIRUPRVW
goods produced in Russia is often due to the increased prices for components or raw materi-
als because of the ruble depreciation.
)LQDOO\ DQRWKHU FKDQQHO RI LQÀXHQFH IURP WKH VDQFWLRQV RQ 5XVVLD¶V *'3 G\QDPLFV
though not yet strongly demonstrated, can be restrictions on Russian exports of certain types 
RIJRRGVSDUWLFXODUO\HQHUJ\UHVRXUFHVDQGUDZPDWHULDOV%HFDXVHWKHSURGXFWLRQRIVXFK
JRRGVVLJQL¿FDQWO\H[FHHGVWKHLUSRWHQWLDOFRQVXPSWLRQYROXPHRQWKHGRPHVWLFPDUNHWDQG
because of the numerous technical restrictions regarding the export geography, reductions 
in the physical volume of exports for such goods will rapidly have an adverse effect on the 
RXWSXWDQG¿QDQFLDOVWDQGLQJRIEXVLQHVVHVLQWKHVHVHFWRUV
8. Medium-term economic growth restraints
7KHDERYHFKDQQHOVRILQÀXHQFHIURPWKHVDQFWLRQVRQ5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\DUHQRWDVHSDUDWH
FULVLVFRPSRQHQW7KH\LQÀXHQFHWKHHFRQRP\LQWKH¿UVWLQVWDQFHE\KDYLQJDPHGLXPWHUP
HIIHFWRQVWUXFWXUDOJURZWKUDWHV+RZHYHULIWKHVDQFWLRQVDUHFDOOHGRIIRUFRQVLGHUDEO\UHOD[HG
or if oil prices increase to a level comfortable for Russia (approximately 80–100 USD/bbl), the 
UHFRYHU\RI5XVVLD¶VHFRQRP\PD\DSSHDUWREHSURWUDFWHG
Russia is conventionally regarded as a raw-material-producing nation whose welfare rests 
SULPDULO\RQK\GURFDUERQSURGXFWLRQDQGH[SRUW5XVVLD¶VRLODQGJDVUHVHUYHVDUHDPRQJWKH
ODUJHVWLQWKHZRUOG,QIDFW5XVVLDGRPLQDWHVWKHFUXGHRLODQGJDVPDUNHWLQ(XURSHDQG
is extensively expanding hydrocarbon exports to China and Southeast Asia. In 2014, Russia 
set a record for oil production (528 million tons). Oil and gas account for 2/3 of exports, and 
revenues from the extractive sector account for over 50% of the federal budget income. 
+RZHYHULWFDQDOUHDG\EHVWDWHGWKDWWKHRLODQGJDVVHFWRULVQRORQJHUWKHNH\GULYHURI
5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWK
7KHDJJUHJDWHFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHRLODQGJDVVHFWRUWR5XVVLD¶V*'3UHDFKHGLWVSHDN
in 2005, at approximately 25% of the GDP. Since that time, it has gradually reduced to 
21% of the GDP (beginning of 2014) (see: Dmitriev and Drobyshevsky, 2015). Indeed, 
since 2005, the oil production output has remained practically unchanged, at approximately 
500 million tons per year. In other words, the real output in this sector has not grown for 
nearly 10 years, whereas the GDP has grown, apparently due to development in other in-
dustries and the service sector. There are no grounds to expect any growth in the physical 
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output of the extraction sector in the years to come. According to our estimates, by 2020, 
the share of the oil and gas sector will not be above 18.0–18.5% of the GDP, or 25% less 
than in 2005. Moreover, oil and gas are not the only raw commodities Russia exports. After 
hydrocarbons, metals (ferrous and non-ferrous) are the next most common, accounting for 
approximately 20% of total exports.
Another conventional factor promoting economic growth is domestic consumer demand. 
+RZHYHUKHUHWKHUHDUHVHULRXVSUREOHPV
)LUVWGHVSLWHUHODWLYHO\ZHDNGHYHORSPHQWLQ5XVVLD¶V¿QDQFLDOVHFWRUWKHSRSXODWLRQKDV
a huge debt burden (Fig. 8).9 Although loans to the population make up only 17% of the GDP, 
due to short average loan terms, a small proportion of long-term mortgage loans, and high 
nominal interest rates, Russians spend approximately 13% of their disposable income on 
VHUYLFLQJORDQV7KLVLVPRUHWKDQLQWKH86IRUH[DPSOHZKHUHWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VORDQGHEWV
total approximately 70% of the GDP but where debt servicing costs are near 10% of income. 
In other words, even after the country overcomes the acute phase of the current crisis, further 
expansion of consumer demand by means of lending is not economically viable and bears 
serious risks.
6HFRQGIXUWKHUH[SDQVLRQRIFRQVXPHUGHPDQGDWWKHH[SHQVHRIWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VUHJXODU
income (wages) is also unlikely. After the decline in the ruble exchange rate during the sec-
RQGKDOIRIODERUFRVWVVLJQL¿FDQWO\GHFUHDVHGLQ5XVVLDEHFRPLQJFRPSHWLWLYHHYHQ
versus countries in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, demographic issues will soon raise wages 
again, and the income of hired employees will increase. At the same time, it is evident that 
economic advancement is impossible if labor costs continue growing, and thus, it will be 
neces sary to restructure sectors and to release and shift the labor force. This makes employees 
more restrained about their future income and more inclined to save (in whatever form).
Third, the inconsistent policy toward developing the pension system drives people to con-
sider providing for themselves on their own after retiring, which also encourages saving. Of 
FRXUVHXQGHUSUHVHQWFRQGLWLRQVZLWKUDWHYRODWLOLW\DQGLQÀDWLRQJURZLQJDQ\ORQJWHUP
VDYLQJVLQPRQH\WHUPVDUHRXWRIWKHTXHVWLRQEXWDGHFOLQHLQLQÀDWLRQDQGDQLQFUHDVHLQ
LQÀDWLRQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ZLOOVLJQL¿FDQWO\KHLJKWHQWKHLQFHQWLYHWRVDYH
 9 For more details, see Vedev et al., 2014.
Fig. 8. Debt burden on disposable income in Russia and the US (%).
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Thus, in the near-future, the population will be net savers repaying their debts rather than 
DFWLYHO\FRQVXPLQJ7KLVSRWHQWLDOO\VHULRXVVKLIWLQWKHW\SLFDOFRQGXFWRID5XVVLDQFLWL]HQ
FRPSDUHGZLWKWKHVVWLOOQHHGVWREHDQDO\]HGDQGXQGHUVWRRGE\GHFLVLRQPDNHUV
From the perspective of state stimulation of demand, there are also restrictions in the 
medium-term, although in the short-run, public spending can be expected to be augmented 
by the means of the anti-crisis package. 
,QWKHV5XVVLDSXUVXHGDUHVSRQVLEOH¿VFDOSROLF\$IWHUWKHFULVLVRIWKHFRXQWU\
paid off external debts, ensured a federal budget surplus, and formed sovereign funds amid 
a favorable external environment. In 2009–2010, thanks to the previously accumulated re-
VRXUFHVLQWKH5HVHUYH)XQGWKHFRXQWU\IXQGHGWKHEXGJHWGH¿FLWDQGWKHDQWLFULVLVSDFNDJH
while keeping government debt at a minimum (approximately 10% of the GDP). In 2012, it 
DGRSWHGDQHZEXGJHWDU\UXOHHQVXULQJDGH¿FLWIUHHEXGJHWDWWKHFXUUHQWOHYHORIRLOSULFHV
+RZHYHUZLWKLQMXVWWKHSDVWWKUHH\HDUVWKHEXGJHWSODQQLQJKRUL]RQLQ5XVVLDDOOWKDWZDV
achieved has begun to face serious challenges.
First, the revenue base of the budget has been reduced. As noted above, taxes on the oil and 
gas sector bring in more than 50% of the federal budget income, and the share of the oil and 
gas sector in GDP is shrinking. Revenues in the oil and gas sector are increasingly coming from 
QHZJUHHQ¿HOGVZKLFKHQMR\FRQVLGHUDEOHWD[SULYLOHJHV(YHQLIRLOSULFHVKDGQRWJRQHGRZQ
tax revenues from the oil and gas sector would still be expected to decrease by 1.0–1.5 p.p. of 
the GDP by 2016. Under an unfavorable business climate, tax revenues from the oil and gas 
VHFWRUVIRUH[DPSOHWKHWD[RQSUR¿WVDUHDOVRORZ7KHUHIRUHDJDLQVWWKHGDWDWKHIHG-
HUDOEXGJHWGH¿FLWZRXOGJURZIURP±WR±RIWKH*'3VROHO\IURPGHFUHDVHG
tax revenues. Reducing average oil prices to 60–80 USD/bbl in 2016–2017 will add another 
±RIWKH*'3WRWKHIHGHUDOEXGJHWGH¿FLW+RZHYHUWKHUHLVDQDGGLWLRQDOIDFWRU²
LQFUHDVLQJEXVLQHVVSUR¿WVE\UHGXFLQJWKHLUUHODWLYHFRVWVDJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRIDGHHSGH-
valuation of the national currency.
Second, there is no certainty about pension reform, a key factor for ensuring budgetary, 
social, and political stability. Among the important measures that are being discussed but have 
not yet been introduced are increasing the pension age (at present, 60 and 55 years old for men 
DQGZRPHQ UHVSHFWLYHO\²WKH ORZHVW UDWH LQ(XURSH GHYHORSLQJ WKH IXQGHG FRPSRQHQW
and reducing the employee categories entitled to early retirement. This uncertainty affects the 
HPSOR\PHQWPDUNHWDQGGRHVQRWKHOSVWUHQJWKHQFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHSXUVXHGSROLF\WKHSUHYL-
RXVO\LQWURGXFHGIXQGHGFRPSRQHQWKDVLQIDFWEHHQIUR]HQZKLFKLQWXUQLQFUHDVHVWKH
ULVNVWRWKH¿QDQFLDOVWDELOLW\RIWKHSHQVLRQV\VWHPDQGRIWKHVWDWHEXGJHW7KHSHQVLRQV\V-
WHPGH¿FLWZLOOJURZEHFDXVHWKHUDWLRRIWKHZRUNLQJSRSXODWLRQWRSHQVLRQHUVLVQRWFKDQJLQJ
IRUWKHEHWWHUDQGPXVWEH¿QDQFHGRXWRIDGGLWLRQDOWUDQVIHUVIURPWKHIHGHUDOEXGJHW
Third, the structure of federal budget expenditures is deteriorating.10 For example, Russia 
still spends little on enhancing the quality of human capital and life (education, health care, 
infrastructure, environment) and allocates the same or even more money for the military-
industrial complex, army, police, and transfers to the Pension Fund.11
The enumerated arguments prove that even if the cyclical crisis is overcome, oil prices 
recover, and the sanctions are canceled (relaxed), with the existing growth model, Russia is 
unlikely in the near-term to return to growth rates of 3.0–3.5% per year. There are discus-
 10 For more details see Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2013.
 11 7KH SUREOHP RI RSWLPL]LQJ EXGJHWDU\ H[SHQGLWXUHV IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZ RI VRFLDO DQG WUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
infrastructure priorities is not new for Russian economic policy. For example, in his speech at the State Council on 
'HFHPEHU)LQDQFH0LQLVWHU$$$ED]DRXWOLQHGWKHEXGJHWDU\SROLF\DVIROORZVµ)LUVWDQGIRUHPRVW
we should cut down on military expenditures... Then, we also need to save funds in other departments, except for 
WKRVHZHVKRXOGVSDUHQRH[SHQVHRQEHFDXVHVSHQGLQJRQWKHPDFWXDOO\UDLVHVWKHQDWLRQDOZHOIDUH¶$FFRUGLQJWR
$ED]DQRH[SHQVHVKRXOGEHVSDUHGRQFROOHJHVDQGVFKRROVRURQGHYHORSLQJWKHFRXUWV\VWHPDQGUDLOURDGVµ:LWK
strict saving on state expenditures... we should encourage in every possible way the diligence and thrift of private 
SHUVRQV²WKHPDLQVRXUFHVRIWKHQDWLRQDOZHDOWK¶3HUHW]3
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VLRQVLQ5XVVLDQDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUHDERXWWKHQHFHVVLW\WRFKDQJH5XVVLD¶VHFRQRPLFJURZWK
model (see, for example, Kudrin and Gurvich, 2014; Idrisov and Sinelnikov-Murylev, 2014; 
8O\XNDHY0DXDQG.X]PLQRY,WLVREYLRXVWKDWLQWKHIRUHVHHDEOHIXWXUHLWLV
impossible to increase structural growth rates (not necessarily sensitive to short-term down-
turns or changes in external market conditions) without implementing an effective anti-crisis 
policy. Still, to ensure that the current crisis does not turn into a protracted economic stag-
QDWLRQ LQ DGGLWLRQ WR WDNLQJ VKRUWWHUP VWDELOL]DWLRQPHDVXUHV LW LV QHFHVVDU\ WR FRQVLGHU
a variety of measures aimed at increasing structural economic growth rates, i.e., at reducing 
production costs and improving total factor productivity, which would depend only on inter-
nal economic policy and not on external markets or the geopolitical situation.
9. Conclusion: Priority measures for social and economic stabilization  
 and development
&KDQJLQJEXGJHWDU\SROLF\SULQFLSOHV
1. Reformulating the principles regarding the immunity of federal budget items, assur-
ing equal immunity of productive expenditures and human capital expenditures, along with 
public and legal commitments. Revising the indexing principles for budgetary expenditures 
considering the dynamics of budget income. Adopting a target-oriented approach to budget-
ing, excluding formal budget cutting.
+ROGLQJEXGJHWDU\PDQHXYHUWKDWDOORZVIRUUHDOORFDWLQJ¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVLQIDYRXU
RISULRULW\H[SHQGLWXUH LWHPV²IRUGHYHORSLQJKXPDQFDSLWDO LQQRYDWLRQVDQGHQKDQFLQJ
the quality of the entrepreneurial and investment climate within the country.
5HGXFLQJFRVWV
1. Adopting a moratorium on tax burden increases: postponing the effective dates of all 
new decisions on increases to some time after 2018. The same also applies to the quasi-tax 
burden.
2. Formulating entrepreneurship requirements, most burden-some and least effective in 
terms of pursuing goals of public concern, deciding on their cancellation or revision.
,QFUHDVLQJ WKH HI¿FLHQF\ RI LQIUDVWUXFWXUDO PRQRSROLHV UHGXFLQJ XQZDQWHG FRVWV
VZLWFKLQJWRDORQJWHUPWDULIIPDNLQJPRGHOLPSOHPHQWLQJQHZDSSURDFKHVWRRUJDQL]LQJ
the heat power market (alternative boiler plants) and the electric power market (retiring inef-
fective generation).
9.3. New business support rules
1. Formulating rules for securing state support of businesses (loans via state banks) 
against guaranteed development of competitive production in world prices (formula: increas-
LQJHI¿FLHQF\LQUHWXUQIRUSXEOLFIXQGLQJ,QSUDFWLFDOWHUPVLWLPSOLHVXVLQJZRUOGSULFHV
IRUHOHFWULFSRZHURLORLOSURGXFWVHWFLQDOO¿QDQFLDOIHDVLELOLW\VWXGLHVEXVLQHVVSODQVDQG
investment projects requesting budgetary or quasi-budgetary funding. A positive value added 
must be created in world prices without persisting in backwardness.
2. Developing tools for state support of large- and mid-scale investment projects having 
a deep multiplicative effect for the economy and contributing to solving infrastructural and 
VRFLDOSUREOHPV(QKDQFLQJWKHTXDOLW\RISURMHFWSUHSDUDWLRQPHFKDQLVPVIRUWKHLUVHOHFWLRQ
when using National Welfare Fund resources and other project funding mechanisms.
3. Using state procurement resources and procurement for companies in which the state 
has a stake (24 trillion rubles or 30% of the GDP) for stimulating domestic production, 
 advancing it to a stage of technological upgrade and competition with world producers. 
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,PSURYLQJWKHEXVLQHVVHQYLURQPHQW
1. Reformulating approaches to control and supervision activities and slashing the number 
and intensity of inspections with respect to most legal entities or facilities that pose no serious 
public risks.
,QWURGXFLQJDWKUHH\HDUµVXSHUYLVRU\EUHDN¶IRUEXVLQHVVHVWKDWKDYHQRWEUHDFKHGHV-
tablished business requirements for three years.
3. Introducing inventory control for the regulatory environment and business practices, 
adopting only electronic submission of reporting forms (which may include canceling hard-
copy reports for small businesses).
4. Canceling mandatory accounting and reporting procedures for small businesses (re-
WXUQLQJWRWKHVLPSOL¿HGV\VWHP²LQFRPHDQGH[SHQGLWXUHOHGJHUV
9.5. Support of non-resource exports
(QVXULQJDFFHVVE\5XVVLDQH[SRUWHUVDQGFXVWRPHUVWRH[SRUWIXQGLQJIRUWKHLUSURGXFWV
on competitive conditions with comparable parameters to the export loans issued by leading 
export credit agencies.
,QWURGXFLQJ WKH FRQFHSW RI DµSDFNDJH JXDUDQWHH¶²DJHQHUDO JXDUDQWHHPXFK ORZHU
WKDQSRWHQWLDOO\SD\DEOHFXVWRPVFKDUJHVXSWR]HURLIWKHLPSRUWHULVDQ\PDQXIDFWXULQJ
business or if the importer has been operating on the market for several years and has proved 
its loyalty, solvency and accuracy in observing customs and tax rules.
3. Introducing a project-based approach that allows building a single product promotion 
FKDLQ²IURPGHWHUPLQLQJ WKHH[SRUWPDUNHWDQGEX\HUREWDLQLQJDORDQDQG LQVXUDQFH WR
promote the project by sales representation directly in the country of stay.
1HZUXOHVIRUFRRSHUDWLQJZLWKIRUHLJQLQYHVWRUV
1. Shortlisting sectors in which foreign investment activity is restricted or prohibited, as-
suming that a foreign investor may participate in any sector if it does not directly involve 
QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ ,QSUDFWLFDO WHUPV WKLV FDQEH LPSOHPHQWHGRQDJUDGXDOEDVLV²ZLWKLQ
3–7 years, so as to avoid rapid asset redistribution at the current stage of depreciation of na-
tional assets.
(QVXULQJ WKH PRVW DWWUDFWLYH LQYHVWPHQW HQYLURQPHQW IRU LQYHVWRUV IURP GHYHORSHG
FRXQWULHV&RQFOXGLQJSUHIHUHQWLDOWUDGHDJUHHPHQWVZLWK$3(&PHPEHUVDQGWKH(XURSHDQ
Union in the medium-term. 
9.7. Revision of social policy
1. Increasing the pension age starting in 2018, and partially leveling the pension age for 
men and women.
2. Making support for socially vulnerable population groups most affected by the weak-
ened ruble (consumers of imported drugs, services that require using foreign equipment) 
more targeted.
3. Abolishing quotas for the issue of work permits to foreign workers and replacing them 
ZLWKSDWHQWV WREHLVVXHGDFFRUGLQJWRVLJQL¿FDQWO\VLPSOL¿HGSURFHGXUHVFRQVLGHULQJWKH
actual drop in the income of migrant workers due to the ruble devaluation, we will need 
every one willing to come to our country to work).
It is important to formulate IXWXUHVRFLDOJXLGHOLQHV to underlie the medium- and long-term 
QDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVWUDWHJ\)RUWKHVHSXUSRVHVWKHQDWLRQDOSURJUDPPH³(QKDQFLQJWKH
28 90DX$8O\XNDHY5XVVLDQ-RXUQDORI(FRQRPLFVí
3XEOLF4XDOLW\RI/LIH´VKRXOGEHDGRSWHG7KHSURJUDPPHVKRXOGVHHNWRDWWDLQWKHIROORZ-
ing social targets:
x increasing the life expectancy at birth by three years compared with 2014;
x LQFUHDVLQJ5XVVLD¶V2(&'%HWWHU/LIH,QGH[E\FRPSDUHGZLWKLQ7XUNH\
DQG%UD]LOKDGVLPLODUSRVLWLRQV
x XSJUDGLQJ5XVVLD¶V0RVW(I¿FLHQW+HDOWK&DUH²%ORRPEHUJ UDWLQJ IURPVWSODFH LQ
2014, to 20th place (in 2014, Portugal, Germany and Greece had similar positions);
x XSJUDGLQJ5XVVLD¶V+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW,QGH[+',IURPWKSODFHLQWRWK
place (in 2013, Spain had a similar position). 
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